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Can Federal Agencies Authorize
Private Suits Under Section 1983?
A THEORETICAL APPROACH
Brian D. Galle'
I. INTRODUCTION
Although since 1980 the Supreme Court has recognized
that private suits against state actors can be premised on
violations of "the laws" of the United States,' no one seems
quite sure whether "laws" include regulations or executive
orders.! The circuit courts have disagreed.3 Indeed, a high-
© 2003 Brian D. Galle. All Rights Reserved.
A.B. Harvard University, J.D. Columbia University School of Law. I am
grateful for the generous grants of time, advice, and support I have received from
readers of earlier drafts, who number among them Michael Dorf, Robert Katzmann,
Stephen Orlofsky, Jim Pfander, David Schizer, and Peter Strauss, as well as a number
of my hapless friends, such as Jon Connolly, Maria Gillen, Jeff M. Hauser, Aziz Huq,
and Kaimi Wenger. I also must thank Kent Greenawalt, Mark Tushnet, and my
supervisors at the Office of Legal Counsel, especially Jonathan Cedarbaum, Robert
Delahunty, and Trevor Morrison, for many fruitful conversations on related issues.
(Almost) needless to say, all errors are my own, the views here do not represent the
views of the United States, etc.
' See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980).
Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress[.]
2 See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 298-301 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that § 1983 is available to enforce disparate impact regulations
promulgated pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000d (2000));
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profile case of "environmental racism," decided in late 2001 by
the Third Circuit, has drawn renewed attention to this
remarkably broad and unsettled question.'
The stakes are large. Already, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the fate of wide swaths of anti-discrimination
law may rest on the availability of the key federal authorizing
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to enforce suits alleging disparate
impact in violation of federal regulations.' Indeed, § 1983
allows private individuals or entities to argue in federal or
state court that virtually any state or local policy is
inconsistent with federal law. Thus, the question of who will
enforce key provisions of nearly every policy initiative shared
by the states and the federal government - from Medicaid and
Social Security to subsidized housing - is also up for grabs.
Despite its prominent policy implications, the
theoretical literature on the use of § 1983 is surprisingly
underdeveloped. The Third Circuit's opinion, for instance,
although heavily dependent on a particular view of statutory
interpretation, never engages the possibility that alternative
views of the right way to read a statute would produce different
outcomes.'
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 437-38 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (expressing doubt that "administrative regulations alone"
can create a right of action under § 1983).
3 Compare S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274
F.3d 771, 790 (3d Cir. 2001), Banks v. Dallas Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 605, 610 n.4 (5th
Cir. 2001), Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1008-09 (11th Cir. 1997), and Smith v. Kirk,
821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987), with San Lazaro Ass'n, Inc. v. Connell, 286 F.3d
1088, 1098-1102 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 403 (3d Cir.
1999), and Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1994).
See S. Camden Citizens, 274 F.3d 771.
See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The disparate
impact regulations are a crucial component of debates about many other important
areas, including special education, school financing, and racial profiling, not to mention
environmental justice. See Jennifer C. Braceras, Killing the Messenger: The Misuse of
Disparate Impact Theory to Challenge High-Stakes Educational Tests, 55 VAND L. REV.
1111 (2002) (special education); Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling
Discrimination in Our Public Schools: Comprehensive Legal Challenges to
Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for Minority Children, 36
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 409-10 (2001) (special education); Sarah S. Erving, Note &
Comment, New York's Education Finance Litigation & the Title VI Wave: An Analysis
of Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 271, 272 (2001) (school
financing); Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV.
41, 73 & n.107 (2001) (racial profiling); Julia B. Latham Warsham, Disparate Impact
Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section 602: Can a Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice?,
27 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 631, 632-33 (2000) (environmental justice).
6 See infra Part II.C.
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This Article offers a few thoughts on the theory of
regulatory enforcement under § 1983. Section 1983, I argue,
itself authorizes federal agencies to make their regulations
privately enforceable. In recent years, the Supreme Court has
announced that federal norms are unenforceable in the absence
of clear statutory authorization - a "clear statement rule" for
private rights of action.7 Drawing on key tenets of modern
statutory interpretation, I claim that the plain text of § 1983
allows many federal regulations to meet this test. Because §
1983 has an important function in coordinating state
regulatory efforts with federal law, a court approaching the
words of the statute must have in mind both administrative
law principles as well as the idea of "federalism," the notion
that even in federally-initiated programs there should be
policy-making space left for states to experiment and innovate.
This Article argues that both factors weigh so clearly in favor of
allowing federal agencies to designate their own regulations for
private enforceability that any reasonable court reading § 1983
would presume that the word "laws" includes regulations.
On the administrative end, the executive branch is
generally entrusted, as part of its power to enforce the laws,
with filling in policy gaps left by unclear statutory text.' Under
the so-called "Chevron doctrine," federal courts must defer to
any suitably authoritative, reasonable administrative
interpretation of federal law It is intuitively appealing to say
that Chevron itself resolves the § 1983 question in favor of
allowing suits predicated on regulations. Under that view, the
choice to superintend a statute through agency personnel, or by
delegation to private litigants, is simply a choice of
enforcement methods best left to the executive. However, as
the Court has become increasingly reluctant to allow private
rights of action without express congressional authorization,
Chevron deference has come into tension with the private right
of action clear statement rule.
The resolution, I argue, depends largely on one's views
about statutory interpretation. For an intentionalist, willing to
find clarity in widely held but unwritten congressional
7 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287-88 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975)).
8 Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144,
150-51 (1991); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984) (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
9 Id.
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assumptions, the very prevalence of Chevron answers the
question in all but the hardest of cases. By contrast, for a
textualist, disinclined to credit unwritten assumptions about
anything except which language we're speaking, Chevron's
judgment about relative institutional competence might not
translate to the reading of statutes that create private rights of
action. However, Chevron deference is not the only canon of
construction that courts should consider when construing the
statute.
In addition to Chevron deference, federalism and its
canons of construction play a crucial role. It has been common
practice on the Court to assume (wrongly) that, because § 1983
permits federal courts to issue orders to state bureaucrats, any
expansion of § 1983 jurisdiction necessarily diminishes state
power. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Court in Gonzaga, a case tightening slightly the standard for
implying a cause of action under § 1983, rested in part on the
claim that federalism concerns favor narrow readings of that
statute.' These assumptions fail to recognize that § 1983
presents unique advantages for states in their relationship to
the federal government. Emerging scholarship in the field of
joint federal-state administrative law suggests that
collaborative vertical arrangements between federal and state
agencies often empower states. Section 1983 litigation makes
these arrangements possible, both by offering a viable
enforcement mechanism to secure the deals between the
agencies and other actors, and by incentivizing states to
develop innovative alternatives to being sued by private
parties.
At the same time, a common fear of cooperative
state/federal regulatory ventures is that the combined
bureaucracy of both governments, perhaps regulating with the
arrogance and assurance of expertise and political insulation,
will slip the ordinary political controls of legislative and
presidential or gubernatorial oversight. Present statutory and
constitutional solutions to this problem, such as due process
rational-basis or state Administrative Procedure Act review,
are limited by the institutional handicaps of the federal
'0 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 286-87 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich.
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)). For an extended discussion of the
Gonzaga opinion, see Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying
the Seeds of a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming
Nov. 2003).
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judiciary." Uncertain where heightened review will further
popular political will or the agency's policy agenda, and unable
to gather empirical data about the combined bureaucracy's
effectiveness, courts usually (and wisely) review the substance
(as opposed to the procedure) of agency decisions only gingerly.
If § 1983 suits are only available when a federal agency
authorizes them, though, the courts are relieved of these
problems. Indeed, if one thinks that states have political
influence on the upper reaches of federal agencies, one would
expect the availability of § 1983 pursuant to federal regulations
to protect, not undermine, state autonomy. Even if states lack
that power, a court presiding over § 1983 litigation is more
solicitous of the states' autonomy than agency regulators need
be. Perhaps more importantly, many § 1983 suits could be
brought in state court, where the state has the power to choose
how best to ensure the political accountability of its judges. On
balance, far from weakening states, agency-authorized § 1983
suits would significantly enhance state sovereignty.
Thus, in interpreting § 1983, courts should apply two
critical canons of construction. The first, epitomized by the
Supreme Court's decision in Chevron," favors executive control
over the means for enforcing federal law. The second, identified
most often with the Court's decision in United States v. Bass,'
3
emphasizes that statutes should be read with a background
presumption against shifting power away from states. Where
" By "due process rational-basis review," I mean federal constitutional
challenges to state regulatory actions based on the theory that the state activity is not
rationally related to its objective. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
314-15 (1976) (per curiam); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 376 (1974); Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); Michael Asimow, The Fourth
Reform: Introduction to the Adminstrative Law Review Symposium on State
Administrative Law, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 395, 397 (2001). For a leading examination of
the shortcomings of this form of due process review, see Ann Woolhandler & Michael G.
Collins, Judicial Federalism and the Administrative States, 87 CAL. L. REV. 613, 681-
700(1999).
Due process challenges to state administrative action may also take the
form of claims for deprivations of "liberty" or "property" interests defined by state law.
See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 529 & n.1 (1981); Edward L. Rubin, Due
Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044 (1984). But these suits
largely depend upon, rather than seek to unsettle, underlying state law and
regulations. Thus, they are mainly useful for attacking improper applications of (or
failures to apply) state law. Since my interest is mainly with the consistency of state
regulation with federal law, I do not give this variety of claim much attention. Others,
however, have commented extensively on the troubled theory underlying the Court's
present approach. See, e.g., Rubin, supra, at 1082-1130.
,2 Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
13 404 U.S. 336, 349-50 (1971).
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an agency chooses to allow private suits to enforce its own
regulations, and it appears that an intent to allow private
litigation can fairly be imputed to Congress in light of
federalism concerns, courts should recognize a right of action
under § 1983.
The sections that follow provide supporting arguments
and more elaborate content to these general principles. Part II
provides a short summary of how courts go about deciding
whether a statute is enforceable under § 1983, and how three
circuits went wrong when they decided that agency regulations
had little or no role to play in that process. Part III explores
what the principles of Chevron reveal about whether the word
"laws" in § 1983 includes regulations clearly enough to satisfy
the clear statement rule. Since Part III concludes that Chevron
is unlikely to satisfy everyone, especially the most exacting of
textualists, Part IV argues that federalism concerns also
suggest that "laws" does include regulations, at least for some
purposes. Part V examines some special problems of private
supervision of state regulators, and explains how those
problems could be largely blunted by federal agency, or joint
federal and state agency, control over the availability of private
rights of action. That Part also addresses some of the major
consequences that flow from the Court's sovereign immunity
jurisprudence, perhaps not all of them intended. Finally, the
Conclusion considers how a court would go about using
regulations to find a private right of action, noting some
variances depending on which justifications it accepted or
rejected.
II. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF § 1983
This Part offers a short review of the use of § 1983 to
enforce both statutory and regulatory federal norms. Judicial
implementation of the latter, I note, has been fairly troubled.
In the last subsection I consider closely the claim by two courts
of appeals that federal regulations are not enforceable under §
1983.
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A. From Thiboutot to Blessing and Gonzaga
Section 1983 authorizes private rights of action for
violations of the "Constitution and laws" of the United States."
The "and laws" clause saw little use until the 1970s, when
several Supreme Court decisions suggested that it might
provide an independent source of federal jurisdiction.' Maine v.
Thiboutot, in 1980, confirmed that suggestion.'6 Over the
succeeding two decades or so, the Court has sharpened - and
generally narrowed - the criteria for determining whether a
particular federal statute is enforceable under § 1983.
In essence, the Court now applies a four-part test,
summarized in its opinion in Blessing v. Freestone.7 First, a
court must determine that the specific provision in question is
intended to benefit the plaintiff.'" This factor is identical to the
first branch of the now - largely obsolete method for
discovering an implied right of action: The "text and structure"
of the statute in question must demonstrate that Congress
intended to confer the particular individual right the plaintiff
seeks to enforce upon the particular class of persons or entities
to which the plaintiff belongs.'" Next, the plaintiff must show
that the right he or she claims is not so "vague and amorphous"
as to escape judicial cognizance.' The plaintiffs final burden,
and the third prong of the test, is to show that the statute
imposes mandatory obligations on states, rather than simply
setting goals or standards.' A plaintiff who succeeds in leaping
those three hurdles creates a presumption that a private right
of action is available.2 Under the fourth prong of the test, that
14 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
'5 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649-50 (1980); Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675-
77 (1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420 (1970); Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S.
808, 829-30 (1966). The question also loomed significantly in the background of the
Court's dispute at the end of the decade over the jurisdictional reach of 28 U.S.C. §
1343. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979). For a more
comprehensive account of § 1983's origins and interpretive history, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
394, 396-411 (1982).
,6 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
,7 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
,' Id. at 340.
'9 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285-86 (2002).
20 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41.
2, Id. at 341 (citing Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 510-11(1990);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
22 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341.
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presumption can be rebutted if Congress has withdrawn § 1983
enforcement, either expressly or, by creating an alternate
scheme incompatible with private enforcement, impliedly.'
Section 1983 rights of action, then, have charted
something of a middle course between other forms of private
suits to enforce federal standards. Under the Court's clear
statement rule, most federal statutes are presumptively
unenforceable unless Congress states clearly, perhaps
expressly, otherwise.4  On the other hand, under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),n courts generally
presume that they may review any final federal agency action
for compliance with federal law.26 Section 1983 shares with the
APA a clear textual commitment to judicial review, and serves
a similar structural function in ensuring that state agencies
comply with federal law. That its scope remains narrower
than APA review probably stems from federalism-related
concerns over subjecting state governments to federal judicial
supervision, or perhaps simply from an effort to prevent easy
shortcuts around the Supreme Court's attempt at curtailing
other private rights of action." Nonetheless, § 1983's APA-type
function raises an important subsidiary question. Most state
agencies carry out their tasks subject not only to federal
statutory requirements, but also under the auspices of
extensive federal regulation. To what extent, then, does the
moderate presumption of judicial enforceability of federal
standards extend not only to statutory but also to regulatory
requirements on the states? Within the context of § 1983
jurisprudence, how, if at all, should federal regulations relate
to the Blessing test?
23 Id. (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994); Smith v.
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 n.9 (1984)).
14 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001).
25 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-706 (2000).
26 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971);
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
27 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983
and the APA, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 233, 235 (1991). Other commentators, noting the
importance of judicial review to administrative processes, have cautioned that the
Supreme Court's view of § 1983 may be too narrow to achieve all the benefits of direct
judicial review. See William H. Timbers & David A. Wirth, Private Rights of Action and
Judicial Review in Federal Environmental Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 403, 416-17
(1985).
28 Cf. Keith E. Eastland, Note, Environmental Justice and the Spending
Power: Limits on Using Title VI and § 1983, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1601, 1611 (2002)
(arguing that "recognition of a § 1983 cause of action would essentially circumvent the
Court's [private right of action] holding[s]").
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B. Wright and Confusion in the Lower Courts
According to conventional understandings of its
precedents, the Supreme Court has never taken a definitive
position on the relationship of federal regulations to the
Blessing test."9 On two occasions, though, the Court has looked
to regulations to help clarify a statute that might otherwise be
too "vague and amorphous" for judicial enforcement.3 As the
majority explained in one opinion, Wright v. Roanoke
Redevelopment & Housing Authority, valid regulations may
"defin[e]" otherwise broad statutory concepts, helping to bring
them within judicial cognizance." The dissent emphasized,
though, that it is unclear to what extent the majority's
reasoning could extend to other requirements of the Blessing
test, such as the determination that Congress intended to
benefit a particular class of persons."
Not surprisingly, then, the Courts of Appeals have
divided over the proper reading of Wright.- A number of lower
courts have assumed that regulations can satisfy any of the
prongs of the Blessing test, including whether Congress
intended to benefit the would-be plaintiff.' Others have said
For a very helpful overview of the doctrinal approaches to this question,
see Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983 to Enforce Title VI's Section 602 Regulations, 49 U.
KAN. L. REV. 321, 342-53 (2001).
30 See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 519 (1990); Wright v. Roanoke
Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1987).
Arguably, the Court actually did decide as early as 1983 that at least some
regulations are generally enforceable under § 1983. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 635-38 & n.6 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In their separate
concurring opinion, Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger argued that Congress'
creation of express administrative remedies, and the Court's finding of a private
remedy under Title VI only for intentional discrimination, both counseled against
finding disparate impact regulations privately enforceable under § 1983. See id. at 608
n.1, 610 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). They seemed to accept Justice Stevens' premise,
however, that § 1983 would be generally available to enforce rules having the force and
effect of law. See id. There is an argument, therefore, that including Justices Brennan
and Blackmun, who both joined Justice Stevens's opinion, there were at least five
justices willing to recognize that valid regulations can support a right of action under §
1983.
" See Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32.
32 See id. at 433-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
3 See King v. Town of Hempstead, 161 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (per
curiam) (noting circuit split).
'u See San Lazaro Ass'n v. Connell, 286 F.3d 1088, 1097-1101 (9th Cir. 2002)
(en banc); Wesley Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. DeBuono, 244 F.3d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 2001);
Indianapolis Minority Contractors Ass'n v. Wiley, 187 F.3d 743, 751-52 (7th Cir. 1999);
Marie 0. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 620 & n.17 (7th Cir. 1997); Doe v. District of
Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188,
192-93 (9th Cir. 1995); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714,
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that regulations may be consulted only to clarify an otherwise
vague or ambiguous statute." Finally, a handful of courts have
considered explicitly what role regulations should play in the
availability of a right of action under § 1983."6 These courts may
have been misled to some degree by Justice O'Connor's doubts
that "regulations alone" may create a private right of action.37
Yet none of the reported cases involve a Youngstown-type
situation, where the executive sought to act without legislative
authority." Each case concerned a regulation validly
promulgated pursuant to a federal statute. The right question,
and the genuinely difficult question, is whether, on a given
requirement, regulations that have the force and effect of law
can satisfy the Blessing test when the underlying statute by
itself does not.
724 n.19 (10th Cir. 1988); Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 199-201 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
35 See Graus v. Kaladjian, 2 F. Supp. 2d 540, 542-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Ceaser
v. Pataki, 2002 WL 472271, at 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002).
36 See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771(3d Cir. 2001); Banks v. Dallas Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 605, 610 n.4 (5th Cir. 2001);
Kissimmee River Valley Sportman Ass'n v. City of Lakeland, 250 F.3d 1324, 1327 &
n.4 (11th Cir. 2001); Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 401-03 (3d Cir. 1999); Boatman v.
Hammons, 164 F.3d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 1998); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1008-09(11th Cir. 1997); Doe, 93 F.3d at 881 (Rogers, J., dissenting); Loschiavo v. City of
Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1994); Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir.
1987).
37 Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 437 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Smith, 821 F.2d at 984 (citing Wright, 479 U.S.
418); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 744 N.Y.S. 2d 130, 147-48 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 2002) (same), affd in part as modified, rev'd in part, N.Y. Slip Op. 15615,
2003 WL 21468502 (N.Y. June 26, 2003).
38 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Even during
the period when the Court was open to implied rights of action, see Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975), the Courts of Appeals were confident that executive orders, with no
underlying authority in an act of Congress, could not give rise to a private suit. See
Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1976) (collecting cases). That
presumption is, if anything, more clearly established now that Congress' role as the
exclusive source of federal jurisdiction is more in vogue. See Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d
732, 747-48 (2d Cir. 1995); Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1338 (4th Cir.
1995); Facchiano Const. Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 987 F.2d 206, 210 (3d Cir.
1993); In re Surface Mining Litigation, 627 F.2d 1346, 1356 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Note,
Enforcing Executive Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Action Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 55 G.W. LAW. REV. 659, 685 & n.156 (1985). My point,
then, is that Justice O'Connor's concern is largely a straw-man position; few would
seriously contend that an agency, without any underlying congressional authority, can
create rights of action. But cf John E. Noyes, Executive Orders, Presidential Intent, and
Private Rights of Action, 59 TEX. L. REV. 837, 860-62 (1981) (arguing that the President
could justify grants of jurisdiction in emergency situations).
39 The Supreme Court has held that regulations having the "force and effect"
of law can serve the same function as a statute. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281, 304-06 (1979). A regulation has the force and effect of law if it is validly
promulgated and has some "nexus" with - that is, is a reasonable extrapolation from-
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Posed in just that way, four circuits have definitively
answered the question. The Sixth Circuit appears willing to
look to regulations for any of the four prongs of Blessing,° while
the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits seem to look to regulations
only to define vague and amorphous statutes." After initially
appearing to agree with the Sixth Circuit," the Third Circuit
reversed course, and may be unwilling to consider regulations
for any of the Blessing factors. 3 The rationales of the Eleventh
Circuit, in Harris v. James," and of the Third Circuit, in South
Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, 4 are a bit opaque, and require closer
analysis.
C. Section 1983 Gets Cement Shoes: Harris, South Camden
Citizens, and Sandoval
Both Harris and South Camden Citizens involved efforts
by private plaintiffs to compel state officers to comply with
federal regulations. Willie Mae Harris represented a class of
Alabama Medicaid recipients who were unable to transport
themselves to their Medicaid providers. Although the Social
Security Act itself was silent on whether states were required
to provide transportation services, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) had issued a regulation
conditioning issuance of federal funds on the state's guarantee
that its Medicaid agency would get Medicaid recipients to and
from their providers.4' HHS claimed that it had authority to
issue the transportation regulation under its general power to
the underlying statute. See id.
40 See Boatman, 164 F.3d at 289-90; Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 551-52.
41 See Kissimmee, 250 F.3d at 1327 & n.4; Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008-09;
Smith, 821 F.2d at 984.
41 See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 401-03 (3d Cir. 1999).
43 See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d
771, 790 (3d Cir. 2001). As the dissent in South Camden Citizens observed, it is not
immediately obvious why the panel was not bound by the Third Circuit's recent
contrary precedent. See id. at 793-99 (McKee, J., dissenting).
127 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997).
45 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001). While this Article was being edited, the Ninth
Circuit decided Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003). Save
Our Valley, without citing prior Ninth Circuit opinions expressly applying Blessing to
the terms of federal agency regulations, see, e.g., San Lazaro Ass'n v. Connell, 286 F.3d
1088, 1097-1101 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), adopted the Third Circuit's reasoning in
South Camden Citizens. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 936-44.
46 Harris v. James, 896 F. Supp. 1120, 1122 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
41 See Harris, 127 F.3d at 996 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 431.53 (1994)).
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require that states provide "such safeguards as may be
necessary to assure that.., care and services will be provided.
. . in .. .the best interests of the recipients."48 The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that this requirement, along with other
similarly general provisions of the Social Security Act, were by
themselves too vague, and not sufficiently mandatory, to be
enforceable under § 1983, leaving the regulation as the only
possible source of law for the plaintiffs 9
Similarly, in South Camden Citizens, the plaintiffs were
residents of a neighborhood sited for a new cement factory.'
Before the factory could open, the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (NJDEP) had to issue the factory
owners a permit. When the NJDEP issued the permit, South
Camden Citizens sued, arguing that the federal Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) regulations required the state
agency, before issuing the permit, to conduct a "disparate
impact" study to determine whether the factory's emissions
would disproportionately burden minority communities (South
Camden is over ninety percent Black and Hispanic).' The
EPA's regulation was intended to enforce Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits recipients of federal
funding from discriminating based on race.2 While the
plaintiffs' suit was pending, the Supreme Court decided that
Title VI did not authorize private suits to enforce federal
"disparate impact" regulations.' The plaintiffs then argued
that the EPA's regulations were also enforceable under §
1983.'
Both courts found that the substantive requirements of
the relevant federal regulations could not be enforced under §
1983. The courts held that a regulation may only serve as the
basis for a private suit under § 1983 when it affects
substantially the same set of acts, or "obligations," as its
underlying statute." In that situation, according to the two
48 Id. at 1005 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19) (1994)).
49 See id. at 1010-11.
W8 Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 774-
75.
51 Id. at 774-76.
52 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
53 S. Camden Citizens, 274 F.3d at 776.
M Id.
55 See id. at 790; Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1008-09 & n.20 (11th Cir.
1997).
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courts, the agency is merely "defin[ing]" a statutory right.' On
the other hand, when a regulation affects conduct not covered
by statute, it is "creat[ing] a right that Congress has not,""7 and
cannot satisfy the Blessing test.
Although the source of this principle was a bit
mysterious at the time of Harris, by the time the Third Circuit
decided South Camden Citizens, the Supreme Court had
decided Alexander v. Sandoval." Sandoval held that
"[1]anguage in a regulation may invoke a private right of action
that Congress through statutory text created, but it may not
create a right that Congress has not.""9 Apparently, an agency
"creates" a right when it attempts to regulate conduct that
would not have been affected by the underlying statute.'
56 S. Camden Citizens, 274 F.3d at 788.
1' Id. at 787.
58 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
51 Id. at 291.
'0 Justice Scalia's opinion offers no real explanation for this holding. The best
the Court can do is to cite to Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994), cited in Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285-86.
However, Central Bank depended not on general rules of administrative law, but
rather on particularized policy and linguistic considerations going to the scope of
liability under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See id. at 174-77. As the Court
explained, "It is inconsistent with settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend
liability beyond the scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory text." Id. at 177
(emphasis added). Indeed, Justice O'Connor's offer of a similar theory in an earlier case
had attracted only four votes. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of
N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 612-15 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 611 n.5 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor's opinion relied primarily on a securities case, Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976), in which the Court had observed that
the power of a regulation "cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by
Congress." Id. at 214. The Ernst Court went on to observe that, while the underlying
statutory text was limited to willful conduct, the SEC had enacted regulations affecting
even negligent breaches of duty. Id. at 206-12. The Court never addressed whether the
regulation was invalid because, as Justice O'Connor seemed to think, it affected
conduct not strictly targeted by the authorizing statute, or simply because penalties on
negligent conduct were an unreasonable extension or outright contradiction of the more
limited statutory text.
South Camden Citizens gamely attempts to justify the conduct rule by
arguing that it is "of paramount importance that Congress intended to create such a
right." 274 F.3d at 788 (emphasis added). But it is still unclear why ordinary
restrictions on the reasonableness and lawfulness of an agency's activities are not
enough to account for what, by its terms, appears to be a garden-variety non-delegation
concern. See infra text accompanying notes 102-109. For example, Sandoval and South
Camden Citizens do not offer any convincing argument why an agency's determination
to cover some conduct not explicitly targeted by an underlying statute is not part of the
agency's power to enforce the statute. See John Arthur Laufer, Note, Alexander v.
Sandoval and its Implications for Disparate Impact Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1613,
1635-40 (2002). Even Congress, which according to the Court is limited by the
strictures of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, can enact laws that "remedy or
prevent unconstitutional actions," notwithstanding that the targeted action is not itself
unconstitutional. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997). Thus, the
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But what should courts do with a statute that delegates
to an agency the power to define, within certain broad
parameters, the conduct that must be regulated in order to
achieve statutory goals? Sandoval allows for that possibility,
noting that "when a statute has provided a general
authorization for private enforcement of regulations, it may
perhaps be correct that the intent displayed in each regulation
can determine whether or not it is privately enforceable.""
Depending upon how one reads "laws," § 1983 may well provide
"a general authorization for private enforcement of
regulations."" Nonetheless, both Harris and South Camden
Citizens, by insisting that a Blessing search for rights-creating
language be limited to statutes, presume that the power to
create a right of action either is not delegable, or that, by the
use of "laws" in § 1983, Congress did not, in fact, delegate it.
However, as the following Parts illustrate, both presumptions
are difficult to defend.
Court's earlier suggestion, in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau,
508 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1993), that a court should not imply a right to contribution when
contribution would extend liability to conduct not covered by the underlying statute,
does not support the outcome in Sandoval. It is one thing to say that courts cannot
expand the coverage of a statute; it is quite another to say that the executive, which is
charged by the Constitution with enforcing Congress' laws, cannot.
Of course, one can always say that permitting some conduct to come within
an existing right of action is not part of an agency's enforcement powers. The question
for the Sandoval court, however, is: Why not? As I suggest later in this Article, rights
of action that exist at the sufferance of a federal agency are equally infused with
agency accountability and expertise as any other enforcement choice. See infra text
accompanying notes 244-275. However, for reasons I discuss in a moment, my
argument can be reconciled with Sandoval.
61 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291.
62 For example, the word "laws" in the statutory phrase, "arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000), has often
been read to include regulations and executive orders, or at least those executive
enactments having the "force and effect of law." See, e.g., Chasse v. Chasen, 595 F.2d
59, 62 (1st Cir. 1979); Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609, 615
(2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.); Farkas v. Tex. Instrument, 375 F.2d 629, 632 & n.1 (5th
Cir. 1967); Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3, 3 (3d Cir. 1964). The federal
habeas corpus statute, which grants federal jurisdiction over writs challenging
"custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2000), has been interpreted to include challenges to federal
regulations. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 849, 857 (1985) (avoiding constitutional
question by directing District Court, on remand, to consider whether INS had complied
with its own regulations in denying parole to § 2241 petitioner). And the Supreme
Court has from time to time read the word "laws" outside the jurisdictional context to
include regulations, as well. See, e.g., Md. Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349
(1920).
[Vol. 69: 1
FEDERAL AGENCIES AND SECTION 1983 SUITS
III. CHEVRON AND § 1983
This Part argues that the assumptions of the Harris and
South Camden Citizens courts were neither inevitable nor
particularly well considered. The first subsection examines the
Chevron doctrine and notes that even if Article I of the
Constitution makes Congress the ultimate source of law
authorizing private suits, that power is almost certainly
delegable. Implicitly, then, the claims of the two courts depend
not on their reading of the Constitution, but on what prove
simply to be the courts' assumptions about what Congress
intended when it enacted § 1983. That is, the courts of appeals
in Harris and South Camden Citizens presumed that even
Chevron's pervasive and powerful unwritten assumption in
favor of executive control over statutory enforcement is
inapplicable unless written explicitly on the face of the statute.
Whether one agrees with that view likely depends on what one
believes to be the best way to read a statute. Thus, the second
subsection analyzes how the predominant modern theories of
statutory interpretation would tackle the problem. Ultimately,
most would produce outcomes different from the decisions in
Harris and South Camden Citizens, although some textualists
might concur with those opinions.
A. The Chevron Challenge to Harris and South Camden
Citizens
The rationale of Harris and South Camden Citizens is
fundamentally textualist. Relying on dicta from Sandoval," the
South Camden Citizens court claimed that "language in a
regulation ... may not create a right that Congress has not."'
Sandoval, in turn, insisted on the clear statement rule: Private
rights of action may have their origin only in the clear text of
congressionally-enacted statutes." That rule, Justice Scalia and
others have said, is necessary to protect the role of Congress as
the sole authoritative source of law giving rise to private rights
of action.'
&1 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
6 S. Camden Citizens, 274 F.3d at 778. Harris takes a similar textualist
turn, although less explicitly than South Camden Citizens.
See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-87.
See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742-49 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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As a general principle, the clear statement rule for
rights of action has some merit. There is a credible argument
that Article I gives Congress sole responsibility for opening or
closing the doors of the federal courts - arguably including
state courts hearing federal actions." The clear statement rule
all but guarantees that those doors will swing open only at the
command of both houses of Congress and the President, or a
supermajority of both houses.' But the clear statement rule
seems insignificant when it comes to finding that a particular
statute should be enforceable under § 1983 precisely because §
1983 itself provides the necessary clear statutory text." Nor has
there ever been a serious claim that the power to authorize
private rights of action cannot be delegated, within reasonable
bounds, to the executive."0
Thus, by applying the clear statement rule only to the
underlying statute, the South Camden Citizens court omitted
necessary intermediate questions: Does the text of § 1983
satisfy the clear statement rule for any regulation that satisfies
the Blessing test?' And does Congress' use of the word "laws"
in § 1983 include regulations clearly enough to satisfy the
textualist/Article I demands of the clear statement rule? These
61 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 95, 101 (1998);
Akhil Reed Amar, Taking Article III Seriously: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 85 Nw.
U. L. REV. 442 (1991); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1207, 1273-74 (2001). For a laundry list of older writings making (or assuming) a
similar claim, see Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress,
and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 1 n.4 (1990).
" See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1199, 1221-22 (1982) (explaining that under the
"formalist thesis," courts "invade the legislative domain by creating remedies that
Congress has not provided" explicitly in statutory text).
69 See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990); Mank, supra
note 29, at 323; Monaghan, supra note 27, at 251; Sunstein, supra note 15, at 415-16.
70 See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767-68 (1996) (upholding
Congress' power to delegate its "plenary power" to regulate the Army); id. at 775-76
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that, absent any textual limitation in the Constitution,
Congress may assign responsibility to the executive to carry out any congressional
power); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 518 (1911) (permitting Congress to
delegate to the executive power to define elements of a criminal offense); I KENNETH
CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.3, at 234 (3d
ed. 1995) ("[A] legislative rule can impose distinct obligations on members of the public
in addition to those imposed by statute, as long as the rule is within the scope of
rulemaking authority conferred on the agency by statute.").
71 Cf. Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State:
Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 764-68 (1997)
(arguing that legislative supremacy justification for limiting judicial review does not
extend to acts of administrative agencies); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 68, at 1200
(claiming that the link between electoral responsibility and administrative action is too
weak to justify limiting judicial review, even in the absence of textual basis for review).
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are troublesome questions, not least because the Court has not
yet set out a definitive list of the factors it will consider when
deciding whether statutory text creating a private right of
action is "clear."
One thing that is clear, though, is that the South
Camden Citizens approach is inadequate. Recall that South
Camden Citizens held that regulations are enforceable under §
1983 only if Congress "intended" to render them enforceable."2
The court further held that congressional intent can be
demonstrated only where the acts covered or obligations
demanded by the regulation match those of the underlying
statute." But that is an odd standard to impose upon
regulations that are, by assumption, valid." By definition,
regulations that have the force and effect of law are
"reasonably within the contemplation" of Congress." So, what
South Camden Citizens in effect demands is that Congress not
merely have contemplated and acquiesced in the creation of a
right of action, but actively desired that it come about and
taken affirmative steps to supplement § 1983's language. That
is a fine distinction to make even for individual human actors.
Scholars since Max Radin have argued that it is an impossible
distinction to make for a legislature."6 Indeed, few modern
theorists of interpretation would take seriously the claim that a
court should look for an actual, specific intention of Congress,77
especially not at the level of detail suggested in South Camden
Citizens."6
Even setting aside that theoretical problem, identifying
Congress' intent as the mandatory source of authority to bring
suit is simply question begging. As Professor William Eskridge
72 S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771,
788 (3d Cir. 2001).
71 See id. at 790.
71 See id.
75 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 303-06 (1979).
76 See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863, 870-72
(1930).
77 I should emphasize here that, in claiming that the two courts of appeals
were looking for the "intentions" of Congress, I do not mean that they were interested
in some sort of hypothetical intention, see, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation,
7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907), or intentions generalized at some high level of
abstraction.
7' See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19-20, 22-25 (2001) (explaining that both textualists and modern
purposivists reject idea that interpretation is a search for actual intentions of
legislature).
20031
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
and others have argued, there are a number of interpretive
attitudes that could be consistent with vesting exclusive
authority with Congress."9 For example, one could read § 1983
as expressing a "general intention" of Congress to grant the
executive branch authority to make more particularized
decisions about the appropriateness of private litigation in
future, unforeseen circumstances.' Or, as the Sandoval Court
put it, § 1983 might "provide[U a general authorization for
private enforcement of regulations."8'
In short, the rationale of South Camden Citizens is
inconsistent with the theoretical structure of modern
administrative law. One of administrative law's key premises,
known now as the "Chevron doctrine," is that Congress intends
to delegate difficult policy decisions implicating the
enforcement of a statute to the executive branch." Applied to §
1983, that idea might allow any regulation to create a right of
action when it is sufficiently formal to satisfy Chevron, and also
meets Chevron's test of reasonableness.' Federal agencies,
after all, can preempt state law with any regulation "'necessary
to ensure the achievement of the [agency's] statutory
responsibilities,"' regardless of whether the agency's
authorizing statute clearly gives the agency the power to
preempt.' Section 1983, while certainly a constraint on state
'9 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
L.J. 319, 333-43 (1989); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 284-91 (1989).
80 See Eskridge, supra note 79, at 342-43.
81 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001).
82 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); id. at 257
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Chevron sets forth an across-the-board presumption, which
operates as a background rule of law against which Congress legislates.. . ."); Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 864-65 (1984); Thomas W.
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 861-62 (2001);
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Adminstration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2086-90, 2102-03 (1990).
See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 619 n.6, 635-38
(1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Only interpretations issued pursuant to the conditions
set by Congress for exercise of an agency's legislative power are entitled to Chevron
deference. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230-31; Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.
576, 586-88 (2000). For the most part, that means either adjudications or rules issued
pursuant to notice and comment. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230. My argument is not
intended to cover adjudication, not least because it is hard to imagine how an
administrative law judge could have occasion to declare that a regulation is enforceable
in federal court.
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699-700 (1984) (quoting
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 706 (1979)). In other words, a pre-emptive
regulation is valid to the same extent any other legislative rule is valid: if it does not
exceed the agency's authority, and is not an arbitrary or unreasonable use of the
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authority, is considerably less burdensome than preemption.'
To the extent that an administrative agency fulfills the
mandate of a general congressional goals or values statute with
a detailed policy regulation,' this argument goes, the agency
should be presumed to have the freedom also to choose the
most appropriate enforcement mechanism for its policy."
The question remains, though, whether Chevron is one
of the factors a court can consider when deciding whether a
statement is sufficiently "clear." Several commentators have
now pointed out that a federal agency's broad preemption
power may be inconsistent with the Court's rule against
reading statutes in a way that diminishes state power." It
similarly might be possible for defenders of South Camden
Citizens to respond to the Chevron critique simply by arguing
that the unspoken assumption of administrative competence
embodied by Chevron is inconsistent with a rule permitting
private rights of action only upon a clear statement. But that
claim is hard to take seriously without a more elaborate
underlying theoretical justification. Modern interpretive theory
now universally recognizes that at least some "unspoken"
agency's power. See id. at 699 (citing Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)); see also
City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988).
as But see Michael S. Greve, Business, the States, and Federalism's Political
Economy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 895, 906 (2002) (arguing that "For state
governors, federal preemption is usually unpleasant but, as a rule, less intrusive and
frustrating than federal micro-management and mandates that entail the expenditure
of state funds."). It is unclear whether Greve's contention is intended as political
science or psychological observation-or what the empirical basis for it may be in either
case.
By a "goals or values" statute, I mean simply a statute that sets out
general principles but leaves some or all of the details of implementation to an agency.
For example, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides rather broadly that 'no otherwise
qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of
her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). In carrying out that mandate, the Justice
Department has developed more elaborate regulations explaining what it means to be
'qualified" and "disabled," and setting out in exquisite detail what recipients of funds
must do to comply with the statute, including maps and sketches of acceptably
accessible facilities. See generally 28 C.F.R. § 41 (2003).
87 See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 101-02
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Sunstein, supra note 15, at 414; cf. United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 n.19 (1997) (holding that an agency's power to "define" a
statute Congress has directed it to enforce "logically and practically" includes the
power to enact prophylactic rules).
s See Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron
Era, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 805 (1998); Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption,
88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000); Damien J. Marshall, Note, The Application of Chevron
Deference in Regulatory Preemption Cases, 87 GEO. L.J. 263 (1998).
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assumptions are a necessary element of any interpretation -
indeed, of human communication.as The challenge, then, is to
sort out which assumptions are consistent with the underlying
principles of the clear statement rule for private rights of
action. The next section, therefore, interrogates two (or,
accounting for internal variations, as many as six) possible
views of interpretation, asking of each whether it could accept
Chevron within its version of the clear statement rule.
B. Can Chevron Fill the Gaps in § 1983? Two (or More)
Views from Statutory Interpretive Theory
The majority of interpretive theories would probably
accommodate both Chevron and the Article I clear statement
rule. Although these theories would not denigrate the clear
statement rule, they would not draw strong distinctions
between assumptions underlying the semantic and other
dimensions of a statutory text.' From the textualist
perspective, however, the Chevron question is a fairly vexing
one. It is important to note, though, that the clear statement
rule can be justified under theoretical approaches other than
textualism - approaches that would almost certainly accept
Chevron as well. The two canons may exist in tension, but they
are by no means incompatible.
Before beginning the individual analyses, I must
explain some of my terminology. Whether explicitly or not, all
sophisticated theories of interpretation now accept that a
reader begins the task of reading with a certain set of
assumptions and background knowledge." This Article terms
that background of knowledge and supposition as the set of
"pre-interpretive assumptions" a reader brings to the
document. Additionally, some theorists believe that one's pre-
interpretive assumptions about a text evolve in the process of
interpreting.' Thus, one might realize, halfway through
reading a statute, that it defines the scope of its own text. I call
these revisions, commanded by the text, "interpretive facts,"
"9 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 249 (2000); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2387, 2455-57 (2003).
90 By "semantic" I mean the portion of a text's meaning that we acquire from
the dictionary definitions of words and the rules of grammar.
9' See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 79, at 346-49 (describing interpretation as a
process of evolving conversation between text and interpreter).
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and refer to this approach to interpretation as the "iterative
view."93 The Chevron doctrine can be described as a canon of
construction favoring executive over judicial prerogative. In
this Article's nomenclature, therefore, it is a pre-interpretive
assumption about the hierarchy of sources for authoritative
constructions of statutes.
1. Intentionalism and the Legal Process School
Most non-textualist interpretive theorists describe the
process of reading a statute as a search for legislative "intent."
In most cases, though, that description is rhetorical or
aspirational.' Modern theorists are generally not concerned
with the actual intentions of legislators, largely because those
intentions can be irrecoverable, hard to cumulate, and at times
simply unworthy of respect." For example, although the "legal
process" school, epitomized by Professors Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks, claimed that the judge's duty was to find the
"intent" of the legislator, they recommended finding it by
assuming that the legislature was comprised of "reasonable"
persons acting "reasonably."' More recent iterations of "legal
93 To be more precise, an iterative theorist's first step in the interpretive
process is to formulate a set of pre-interpretive assumptions. Based on these
assumptions, she identifies the four corners of the authoritative text she is to construe.
For example, if she is an originalist, when she reads the Constitution, she will consider
as authoritative not only the text of the Constitution, but also the surrounding history
of its creation and reception among some or all of nascent American society. (In that
case, there are more like four million corners, rather than four.) She next begins
reading the text according to other sets of pre-interpretive assumptions: for example,
that the rules of English grammar apply, and that the literal meaning of words will be
what they meant at the time they were written, or what they mean now, or what they
have meant to a reasonable reader over all the intervening periods. As she encounters
the text, she may discover some commands that seem contrary to some of her pre-
interpretive assumptions-perhaps reading Article III to forbid someone like her, a
judge, from applying originalist principles. John Rawls described the end result of this
process of calibration and re-calibration, of adjustment of text to values, and values to
text, as the "reflective equilibrium." See JOHN RAWIS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19-21, 45-
51 (1971). Another commentator has argued that interpreters inevitably so color their
understanding of what is required of them by intermediate steps in the iterative chain
that, in effect, there is only one interpretation, guided primarily by the reader's notion
of what makes the "best" text. He claims, furthermore, that this result is not only
defensible but also the better of the two approaches. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE 228-38, 250-75 (1986).
94 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in
the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (describing interpretative process as
'one of imaginative reconstruction").
95 See DWORKIN, supra note 93, at 317-27.
96 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William Eskridge & Phillip
Frickey eds., 1994).
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process" also impute similar value-laden "intentions" to
statutory text.97
That is not to say that most legal process theorists view
the statutory text as an open invitation to import the values of
the interpreter. The legal process interpreter relies instead on
only a limited universe of imputed intentions, generally those
resting on assumptions that either have, or are deserving of,
widely-held popular support.' Thus, the rules of grammar or
constitutionally-protected norms are fair game, but a judicial
preference for a particular outcome in a particular case
probably is not.' Although the legal process theorist recognizes
the importance of democracy in law making, she believes that
democratic values can be satisfied either by the requirement
that imputed norms be widely-held (either actually or
hypothetically) or by the exercise of legislative intent at a very
high level of generality."n
Despite her willingness to find legislative "intent"
without direct semantic support in many instances, the legal
process interpreter nonetheless could agree that some
congressional clear statement rules, such as the private-right-
of-action rule, are necessary. Again, constitutionally-inspired
norms are a common source of authority for the legal process
interpreter's canons of construction.' °' Thus, the legal process
interpreter might refuse to read a statute in a way that would
violate the Constitution, unless a higher priority canon - for
example, the rules of English language and grammar -
commanded an opposite result."2 Since there might be a fair
97 See DWORKIN, supra note 93, at 336-38; William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About
Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-
1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1002, 1099 (2001); Eskridge, supra note 79, at 350-51.
98 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Circumstances of Politics and the
Application of Statutes, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 558, 565 (2000); Stewart & Sunstein, supra
note 68, at 1229-32.
99 Cf. HART & SACKS, supra note 96, at 1374, 1380 (arguing that statutory
terms should not be given meanings the text cannot bear). Needless to say, there are
divisions within the intentionalist school on which pre-interpretive assumptions are
permissible, and what priority these assumptions have over interpretive facts. Thus,
Professor Dworkin seems open to judicial applications of a wide variety of judicial
norms, at least in cases that implicate more than mere "policy," and would give priority
to those norms over interpretive facts in many instances. See DWORKIN, supra note 93,
at 202-06, 219-25.
'0o See Eskridge, supra note 98, at 572-74; Eskridge, supra note 79, at 323-24;
Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 625-26
(1949).
See HART & SACKS, supra note 96, at 1376.
2 See id.
[Vol. 69: 1
FEDERAL AGENCIES AND SECTION 1983 SUITS
argument that non-legislative creation of private rights of
action would violate constitutional principles of separation of
powers,' °  the legal process interpreter could well agree that
only a semantically clear text should be read to require that
result.
It is more likely, however, that the legal process
interpreter will see no conflict between Chevron and the right-
of-action clear statement rule. For one thing, she might see the
clear statement rule as identical to the textualist claim that
Article I authority proceeds only from semantically clear
statutory language." Since she views Chevron as an exercise of
congressional meta-intent, or perhaps as an imputed
preference for executive decision making, she would find it
sufficiently grounded in congressional agreement to satisfy
Article I."'
There are several other justifications for the clear
statement rule, though, that might give the legal process
interpreter a bit more pause. First, as Professor Sunstein
points out, we can view clear statement rules as a sort of
republican" non-delegation doctrine, where a court insists that
for certain constitutional or prudential reasons, Congress first
actually deliberate and reach agreement on an issue before a
court will act on it.' ' But, by hypothesis, the legal process
interpreter believes that Chevron already commands or
deserves widely-held respect. What would be the point of
deliberating - or, in effect, re-deliberating - the same question?
We might say that, although Chevron commands wide
support as a general principle, it should not apply in
circumstances where legislators, or voters, would prefer to
make critical value judgments themselves, even in the event of
changing circumstances. Indeed, in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme Court recognized just
such a limitation on the scope of Chevron deference.'0
103 See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
104 See infra note 110.
'05 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 89, at 318.
'06 That is, a decisional process that is the result of reflective and informed
debate, rather than passing popular opinion. The grandfather of all republican theories
is THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 42-47 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
'07 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 89, at 179, 344-45; Sunstein, supra note
82, at 2114.
,08 529 U.S. 120 (2000); see also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116
(1976) (holding that "due process requires that the decision to impose [a] deprivation of
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Deliberation might serve to supplement Brown & Williamson,
providing for shared, republican consideration of the margins
of what judgments Congress considers so critical that it is
unwilling to delegate them. But it seems implausible that the
existence of a private right of action for any particular statute
has such monumental social importance that it even
approaches the Brown & Williamson exception, and so the
rationale for deliberation remains rather thin."n
In short, then, an intentionalist interpretation of § 1983
will very likely conclude that it is appropriate to apply the
Chevron presumption to the word "laws,""0 authorizing private
rights of action on the basis of agency regulations. Chevron, of
course, does not supercede the Constitution, but to the extent
that the clear statement rule is based on constitutional values,
Chevron largely meets those concerns.
2. Textualism
a. How Textual is My Text?
The general outline of textualism is fairly familiar.
According to textualists, the separation of powers embodied in
the Constitution limits proper judicial attention to the
semantic dimension of a statutory text."' That is, because laws
an important liberty be made either [by Congress or the President] or, if it is to be
made by the [agency], that it be justified by reasons which are properly the concern of
that agency"); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 82, at 844-45 (arguing that for
.extraordinary" legal questions, congressional silence should be assumed to reflect an
intent to withhold Chevron deference (citing Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159;
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468-69 (2001)).
'09 Sunstein's remaining claim is that clear statement rules help to re-inflate
the enforcement of constitutional norms that the Court, for the classic prudential
reasons, often under-enforces or finds nonjusticiable. See Sunstein, supra note 82, at
2114-15. But limits on the Article III power of courts to create remedies are unlikely
candidates for "underenforced" rights. Indeed, to the legal process scholar, the recent
growth of constitutional standing doctrine, textualism, and textualist-inspired limits on
federal jurisdiction make Article III over-enforced, if anything.
',o Even if she did believe that a clear statement rule was necessary, a legal
process interpreter might well find that "laws" in § 1983 clearly includes federal
regulations. For example, an originalist might consider what "laws" meant at the time
of its enactment, while other intentionalists, such as Professors Dworkin or
Michelman, might look to how society's understanding has evolved through history.
The Congress that amended the Civil Rights Act in 1874 thought it possible that its
predecessor Congress, in using the term "Constitution," might have meant every law
authorized under the Constitution. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 404-05. By analogy,
the word "law" could include any valid regulation promulgated pursuant to law.
Subsequent history has ratified this understanding, albeit in different contexts. See
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295-96 (1979).
' See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role
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may not have binding effect unless they have been passed by
both houses of Congress, either with the President's agreement
or by a supermajority of both houses, courts unconstitutionally
expand a law's reach when they insert elements that could not
command such widespread support."2
Similarly, the textualist explanation for the private
right of action clear statement rule is essentially libertarian
and majoritarian; it displaces private ordering only in the face
of language ratified by a majority of directly elected public
officials.' 3 Private rights of action, in contrast, allow a single
individual to rearrange the results of any number of
unregulated transactions, as long as she can convince a judge
that her theory of the law is correct."' When enforcement
depends on action by the government itself, however, the very
same underlying law can have a distinctly majoritarian flavor.
Thus, Congress' monopoly over private rights of action might
be explained as an effort to preserve the majoritarian character
of law; individuals may only control the decision to enforce a
law when an elected majority decides to devolve that power."5
This, in turn, might be said to enhance the overall autonomy of
the citizenry, because it ensures not only that most outcomes
are those that were chosen by most voters, but also that purely
private choices will govern where no clear consensus emerges.'
Viewed through the majoritarian lens, the separation-
of-powers explanation for textualism is rather friendly to
Chevron. The textualist would likely argue that courts should
presume that uncertainties in statutory law should be resolved
principally by the executive, as the more representative, and
therefore more majoritarian, branch."7 Chevron and textualism
of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 9-13, 34-35 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
"' See Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring); Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1119-20 (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 539 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains].
"' See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 68, at 1221-22.
1 In this respect, hostility to private rights of action piggy-backs on the now-
familiar concerns about the "countermajoritarian difficulty." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16
(1962).
115 See Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1968).
"1 Cf. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 112, at 549-50 (arguing
that one major justification for textualist approach is that it preserves private
orderings).
117 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference
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can thus be reconciled as a preference for policy making by the
"political branches" over the judiciary."8 That leaves open,
however, the crucial question for us here: What presumption
does separation of powers theory suggest when the choice of
authority lies not between the executive and judiciary, but
rather between the executive and the legislative branches? Or,
put another way, should we trust the executive branch to
preserve the autonomy-enhancing character of law as much,
less than, or more than Congress?' 9
In order to answer that question, a textualist would
likely turn to a functional comparison of the two branches.""
However, as the next subpart explains, a functional analysis
fails to resolve the question.
b. The Indeterminate Functional Analysis
Most traditional theoretical models of government
would be receptive to agency-authorized private rights of
to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 625-26 (1996).
8 See id. at 627.
"9 I should emphasize that my question for the remainder of this Part is not
whether the executive has the power to create private rights of action on its own,
without Congressional support. Rather, I ask only whether, given the relative
competencies of the two branches, we should impute to Congress an intention to share
its own undisputed authority to establish a private right of action with the executive
branch. Although one could argue that the power should be absolutely non-delegable, I
cannot see any purely textual-rather than functional-argument for that position.
'20 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A
Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1339 (1994).
A textualist who thinks textualism is rooted in the original understanding
of the Constitution would also likely be interested in an originalist historical analysis.
See infra notes 138-139. In that regard I note that one earlier commentator has argued
that the Congress of 1871 would have not have understood "laws" to include
regulations. See Todd E. Pettys, The Intended Relationship Between Administrative
Regulations and Section 1983's "Laws," 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (1998). Although an
extended discussion is beyond the scope of this article, Pettys's evidence is not very
persuasive. He argues first that the strong version of the non-delegation doctrine
prevailing in the nineteenth century would have led congressmen to think of "law" as
distinct from "regulation." Id. at 86-93. But that demonstrates, at best, an
understanding of the legislative power, not the linguistic meaning of the word "law."
Nineteenth-century thinkers may well have considered the executive power to be
entirely distinct from the legislative, but both as subspecies of "law" in general. Indeed,
Pettys' own examples demonstrate that by 1890, federal judges were willing to consider
a validly enacted regulation a "law." See id. at 97 (quoting United States v. Manion, 44
F. 800, 801 (D. Wash. 1890)). Finally, Pettys points to the fact that the revised statutes
provided that some "regulations" could not be inconsistent with "law" or "laws." Id. at
96. What he fails to recognize is that a century later, in 1979, the United States Code
still directed, in the Administrative Procedure Act, that regulations were invalid if
'contrary to law." Yet the Supreme Court still held that the term "law" included valid
regulations. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295-96 (1979).
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action. For example, "public interest" theorists, who are
generally sympathetic to bureaucratic decision making,'' might
actually prefer an agency's discretion to that of Congress. A
judge who adhered to the more cynical "capture" theory, which
is highly dubious that agencies can make public-minded
determinations,"' would want the power to read agency
regulations aggressively in search of greater opportunities for
judicial review.'' Finally, a proponent of so-called "public
choice" theory, which extends its cynicism to include
legislatures and courts, would seem nonetheless to favor, at
least slightly, decisions by the President and his highest
advisors.' 4  Thus, under the three common models of
" Public interest theory claims that agency bureaucrats are committed to
representing the public interest, and have the tools - centralized authority, universal
jurisdiction, expertise, and shelter from political storms - to carry out their appointed
mission. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 70, § 2.6, at 78; Thomas W. Merrill, Capture
Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1049 (1997). As Merrill
points out, the most eloquent advocate of the public interest view was probably James
Landis. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
' Capture theory embodies a disenchantment with agency bureaucrats,
arguing that their close dealings with regulated entities, and their dependency on
those groups for power and influence with the other branches of government, leaves the
bureaucrats vulnerable to co-optation by the narrow interests of the regulated at the
expense of the public at large. See Merrill, supra note 121, at 1050-51; Richard A.
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974);
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89
GEO. L. J. 97, 114 (2000).
123 See III DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 70, § 16.11, at 69; Sunstein, supra note
82, at 2082. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit is presently engaged in the same kind of exercise
in its interpretation of the "procedural rule" exception to the APA. See Jon Connolly,
Note, Alaska Hunters and the D.C. Circuit: A Defense of Flexible Interpretive
Rulemaking, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 162-67 (2001). As the Alaska Hunters
controversy illustrates, an agency will be able to fight back against aggressive judicial
interpretation of its regulations by issuing more formal regulations clearly disclaiming
the court's reading. But that largely accomplishes the purpose the court is seeking: to
force public scrutiny and input into the procedures, if not the outcomes, of the agency's
decisions.
14 For example, Professor Mashaw argues that the President is the most
representative member of the federal government, and his overwhelming influence
over major policy decisions in the executive agencies makes those decisions highly
democratic, perhaps more democratically legitimate than legislation. See JERRY L.
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC
LAW 152-56 (1997); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, 467 U.S.
837, 865-66 (1984); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 67, 83, 106
(1991); Easterbrook, supra note 120, at 1341. Mashaw points out that the President is
responsive to a more diverse pool of voter interests than any individual legislator, and
he is better at escaping the agenda-setting problems that hamper the democratic
character of legislation. MASHAW, supra, at 152-56.
Other writers have argued that agencies help to restore Madison's vision of
a relatively insulated, deliberative body lost with the enactment of the Seventeenth
Amendment. See JOHN A. ROHR, TO RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 171-94 (1986); Spence & Cross, supra note 122, at 131-33.
Finally, advocates of the so-called "unitary Executive"-that is, an executive branch
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government, there are strong arguments favoring agency
exercise of the delegated power to authorize private rights of
action.
The trouble with this conclusion is that there is trouble
with the "big three." All three models, after all, are just that:
models. They simplify reality by making certain questionable
assumptions - most notoriously, for example, public choice
theory often presumes that agency bureaucrats are rationally
self-maximizing. '
A new wave of critics of public choice theory has begun
to suggest alternative models of government behavior based on
more psychologically realistic assumptions about human
behavior.'" A social psychologist, for example, might begin by
observing that a person's perception of her social role has an
important influence on her behavior.'27 Societies form sets of
expectations for the way that individuals in certain roles -
"mother" or "boss" - will behave, reinforcing those expectations
through social sanctions, such as shaming, and through ritual
and repetition.'2" Once these social expectations are
internalized, we experience cognitive dissonance, shame, or
embarrassment when we behave in ways that are role
inappropriate.' 9 Thus, a society that expects its public servants
entirely subject to the formal legal control of the President-would likely agree that, if
their vision of the President's legal powers were widely shared, the executive would be
more genuinely representative of national interests than Congress. For examples of the
unitary executive school, see CHARLES A. FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE
REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 151-71(1991); Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541
(1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1991).
25 Of course, one could also construct something that looks much like a public
choice analysis using alternative, perhaps more realistic, sets of assumptions. See
David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397,
398 (2002).
126 See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); Gregory
Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1910 n.5 (2002) (observing
that the past three years have seen five separate law review symposia on law and
behavioral psychology).
,.7 See BERNARD GUERIN, SOCIAL FACILITATION 164 (1993); Philip E. Tetlock
et al., Social & Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability: Conformity,
Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 632, 638 (1989).
"8 See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law & Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585,
585-86 (1998); Robert C. Ellickson, Law & Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 537, 539-40 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1130 (2000)
,29 See Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 99,
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to be public minded creates social pressure on those servants to
act accordingly.'; Similarly, social psychology also could lead to
renewed analysis of institutional ideology - the idea that
members of some parts of the government, such as the Senate
or the federal judiciary, see themselves as possessing a unique
role, and tend to act consistently with that view despite what
pure economics would predict are strong incentives to the
contrary. '
This suggests that the relative trustworthiness of any
two branches of government is socially contingent. That, in
turn, deeply undercuts the categorical presumption that,
because the executive can be trusted truly to reflect democratic
will, Congress "intends" to delegate to the executive the
authority to create a private right of action. Worse, because the
effectiveness of social roles depends in large part on the degree
to which they are internalized by individual actors,
trustworthiness is contingent in ways that are not readily
measurable, whether by judges or anyone else."" A presumption
based on, for instance, judicial synthesis of historical and
present social norms and expectations would be unlikely to be
much more than ad hoc, even if Hercules himself1 3 were to
conduct it.
Another critique of Chevron could be fashioned from an
entirely different direction, by challenging the idea that the
executive is meaningfully democratic or representative.
Matthew Adler has argued, for instance, that Chevron fails to
99-100 (1989).
:10 This approach could give theoretical muscle to the suggestions by some
political scientists that the theories of government are actually self-fulfilling
prophecies. See MASHAW, supra note 124, at 26-27; Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi & Cynthia R.
Farina, Cognitive Psychology & Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549,
607-08 (2002).
... See STEPHEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY 244-45 (James Q. Wilson
ed., 1987); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 562, 570 (2000); Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
711, 767 (2001); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977).
131 Cf. I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 70, § 2.6, at 79 (observing that courts
cannot predict accurately the outcome of any truly accurate behavioral explanation for
the conduct of public actors); ROBERTO M. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-
NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 187 (1987)
(noting that the relationship between the mindsets of workers and managers, and their
corresponding institutions and practices, are highly contingent and difficult to predict
or extrapolate from).
"' Hercules is Professor Dworkin's imaginary judge, whose considerable
knowledge and analytical powers allow him to reach right answers even to difficult
legal questions. See DWORKIN, supra note 93, at 239.
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enhance the democratic character of government.' 4 According
to Adler, an average voter might simultaneously desire to
delegate decision-making power to an expert agency, but also
have individual preferences or particularized values contrary to
the agency's decisions, and further desire that the agency not
have the power to make decisions contrary to or
incommensurable with those individual preferences or values. '
In sum, a textualist would have reason to be uneasy
with applying a Chevron-type presumption to statutory text
creating private rights of action.' 6 The ensuing Parts of this
Article consider whether textualists or others would be swayed
by an alternative presumption, one that Congress ordinarily
intends not to undermine the power of states to determine their
own form of government. It is also important to note again
that, on the other hand, the clear statement rule and Chevron
are not incompatible. Textualism is not the only theory that
could justify the clear statement rule, and each of the
alternative theories have little difficulty with Chevron. For the
non-textualist, there is not much reason why valid regulations
should not be able to satisfy the various prongs of the Blessing
test.
IV. SECTION 1983 AND THE FEDERALISM CANON
This Part argues that the Court's federalism canon
favors enforceability of agency regulations under § 1983.
Federal regulation, in the conventional view, undermines state
autonomy. Yet concurrent regulation of the same social
problems by states and the federal government can offer
significant autonomy gains for states. This is especially so in a
scheme that is not only concurrent but also designed to
maximize cooperation between the two levels of government.
'3 See Adler, supra note 71.
'35 In my view, the force of Adler's critique is undercut somewhat by the
Brown & Williamson exception to Chevron - that no delegated authority should be
presumed in matters of "great importance." That is a debate for another time.
136 In raising these two objections, of course, I do not mean to suggest there
are no others. One can imagine, for instance, an argument akin to the critical legal
studies complaint that interest-group based theories of judicial review are
indeterminate without underlying normative baselines. See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge,
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31,
49-59 (1991); LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994) (arguing that the modern American concept of
"representation" is a social construct grounded in illegitimate subordination of some
groups).
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Private rights of action under § 1983 are an important aspect of
any genuinely successful cooperative design. Most crucially,
privately-invoked judicial oversight offers a safety valve of
public accountability for a state bureaucracy that might
otherwise escape the controls of its state executive. Agency-
authorized suits under § 1983 avoid many of the classic
problems that hamstring traditional state administrative-law
efforts to achieve the same result. Finally, judicial resolution of
disputes between federal and state agencies is superior to
resolution through "informal" dealings between the two sets of
regulators, in which states generally fare poorly. In turn, these
considerations suggest that if courts take the federalism
canon' 7 seriously, they should read § 1983 to permit agency
authorization of private suits. First, though, I must establish
that a textualist would be willing to consider an atextual
presumption in favor of federalism values.
A. The Bass Hook: Would a Textualist Bite?
This subpart argues that the textualist assumptions of
South Camden Citizens and Harris must give way to another
canon, one that commands Congress to speak clearly before a
court will upset the balance of state and federal power. The
inquiry turns on whether granting agencies the power to define
a right of action has implications for federalism, and if so, in
what direction. I explore that complicated question in the
subparts following this one. First, though, this subpart
examines the relationship between textualism and the
principles of federalism.
One view of textualism describes that theory as a
necessary product of an originalist interpretation of the
Constitution." It follows from that premise that any pre-
interpretive assumptions that anteceded the originalist reading
of the Constitution, and survive that process of interpretation,
should continue to govern readings of statutory text."9 The
,37 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991).
'3 See John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the
Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1648, 1649-51 (2001) (summarizing originalist
constitutional argument for textualist statutory interpretation).
"'9 See Manning, supra note 78, at 113 (noting that textualists can "draw upon
settled background conventions of the legal system, which judges can use to fill in gaps
left by the text alone"). Professor Manning goes on to conclude that textualism is
consistent with an atextual presumption in favor of federalist values, unless the
semantic dimension of a text is inconsistent with that presumption. See id. at 122-23.
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federalism canon, expressed most famously in United States v.
Bass, ' is logically prior to both textualism and the quasi-
textualist Article I justifications of Harris and South Camden
Citizens in just this way. The principle of federalism, as the
Supreme Court has explained it, derives its constitutional
authority from the fact that it was a widely-shared assumption
of the founding generation when they crafted and ratified the
Constitution.'4 ' The Court has often relied upon this preexisting
understanding as a basis for concededly extra-textual aspects
of federalism, such as the states' sovereign immunity from
suit. '
Nor is there anything in the text of the Constitution
that would contradict this pre-interpretive assumption.
Textualism, under my working theory, is grounded in the
Article I and Article III limits on federal courts to expand their
own power, on structural inferences about the three branches
derived from the text of the Constitution, and on historical
One is also tempted simply to argue that any textualist who accepts the
Ashwander principle of constitutional avoidance should welcome the Bass canon. See
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). Justice Brandeis' approach in Ashwander-and the approach of subsequent
cases, such as Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988)-assume that the most natural reading of a statute should
give way to semantically possible, but less favored, readings that stand farther from
the penumbra of constitutional requirements. Indeed, the avoidance canon is only
meaningful when it rearranges the ordinary semantic meaning of the text. See
Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 86. If the textualist is
content allowing a judge's prediction of what the Constitution would say to displace a
semantically preferred meaning, she should, a fortiori, be willing to impute clear,
preexisting constitutional requirements into texts that are open to them. Justice Scalia
has often invoked the avoidance canon. See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 32 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 356
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 250
(1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In fact, though, the avoidance principle is a serious
problem for a Manning-type textualist, who believes that textualist methods are
themselves required by the Constitution. See Manning, supra note 78, at 121, 125
(tentatively endorsing avoidance canon because it permits textualism to account for
concerns about justice reflected in the Constitution, but noting that the doctrine
presents other theoretical problems for the textualist). How are we supposed to
reconcile what are, in effect, two competing constitutional requirements? Thus, in the
succeeding paragraphs, I rely on my claim that some constitutional commands may
take logical precedence over others. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 2109-10 (explaining
that there is a hierarchy of canons).
140 404 U.S. 336 (1971). Other prominent federalism-canon cases include
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460-63, and Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-
43 (1985) (asserting that if Congress intends to alter "the usual constitutional balance
between the States and the Federal Government," it must "unequivocally express this
intention in the statutory language.").
,' See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 715-19, 722-27 (1999); Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
141 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54-55 & n.7 (collecting cases).
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developments in the founding era. "3 Limits on private rights of
action are grounded more particularly in Article I.'" Yet the
Supreme Court has already held that Article I, and the other
texts and events preceding the enactment of the Eleventh
Amendment, cannot undo the founder's presumptions about
the nature of federalism. "' It would be understatement to say
anything but that the decisions setting out that theory -
Hans,"' Alden, and their kin - have an angry throng of critics.47
It is also hard to see how one could avoid agreeing that, while
those cases remain good law, federalism survives the textualist
constitutional genesis, and should remain a feature of any
reading of the text of § 1983.
One can also justify the ways of federalism to
textualism by employing a jurisprudential account of
textualism.' Professor Jeremy Waldron has described
textualism as a product of respect for the source of
authoritative law.'49 According to that view, lawmaking is
binding on us only if it is the product of genuine debate among
numerous and diverse legislators over honest disagreements
about values and methods. 0 Yet, as Waldron seems to agree,
not everything that becomes law is disputed, or even written.''
The Statutes at Large do not include a copy of Webster's
Dictionary, yet one surely owes respect not to a series of
symbols and glyphs, but to a widely held or fair understanding
of the words the legislature uses to embody its agreement.'
Otherwise the debates we are supposed to respect are debates
about nothing. Widely-held understandings, about which there
143 See supra text accompanying notes 112-116.
144 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 95, 101 (1998).
145 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) (citing
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 79 (2000); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73;
College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672
(1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 636 (1999); Alden, 527 U.S. at 730-33).
146 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
141 See Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 485, 485 n.1 (2001) (collecting angry critics).
148 For a recent, more comprehensive effort in this direction, see John F.
Manning, Legal Realism and the Canons' Revival, 5 GREENBAG 2D 283, 289-93 (2002).
141 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 105-06, 108 (1999).
'5 See id. at 79-80, 105-18, 136-38, 141.
"" See Jeremy Waldron, Legislators' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation,
in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 339 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995); see also Joseph Raz,
Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW 249, 258-59 (Robert P. George
ed., 1996).
1 2 See Waldron, supra note 151, at 339.
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is no need for debate, concerning the meaning of words that
actually appear in the statute, demand our respect and bind us
to their authority.":' While there might be some quibbles about
how widely held is wide enough,' " or about the fairness of the
processes that lead to that ultimate agreement, constitutional
commands would probably meet any standard."e This view of
textualism suggests that the theory is open to constitutionally-
inspired definitions of statutory text.
In its various forms, then, textualism is not only
compatible with the Court's federalism canons, but also
necessarily secondary to them. When construing statutes, a
textualist court must also consider implicit presumptions about
the balance of state and federal power. From here, the
following subparts argue that the federalism canon in fact
supports reading § 1983's "laws" to include valid regulations.
.53 Professor Eskridge, in offering a similar analysis of Waldron, claims that
proper respect for what legislatures do should also take account of an array of
unwritten, and in his view largely uncontroversial, assumptions about what the
legislature sought to accomplish. See Eskridge, supra note 98, at 565, 572-74. In this
respect, he echoes two decades or more of criticism, much his own, that have been
leveled at the textualist school. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 79, at 210-15; Stewart &
Sunstein, supra note 68, at 1230-31, 1317 (arguing that textualism "denies the respect
for the sovereign lawgiver upon which it is supposedly based" and that "silence is
inarticulate in the absence of background understandings that give it meaning").
I agree that Waldron has no especially compelling response to these
arguments. Still, even textualists who permit some widely-held background
assumptions, such as those required by the Constitution, often draw a distinction
between assumptions that are needed to understand or define words in the statute, and
added terms that give fuller content to the statute as a whole. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 n.19 (1976) (Powell, J.) ("To let general words draw
nourishment from their purpose is one thing. To draw on some unexpressed spirit
outside the bounds of the normal meaning of words is quite another . . . .") (quoting
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1944)). Perhaps that
evanescent distinction can be justified by arguing that "definitions" are necessary to
make the results of legislative processes meaningful, but, as "implied terms" are not,
we should not risk binding ourselves unnecessarily to a presumption that might not be
as uncontroversial as we think. Regardless, my argument in this Part focuses on the
definition of the word "laws" in § 1983. No implied terms are necessary.
I For example, some justices have drawn the line between permissible
judicial amendments of "absurd" results, and impermissible re-writing of a statute, at
whether "the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone." Public
Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Absurdity, in this view, is simply a measure of the degree of popular
agreement or disagreement with a particular interpretation. The slippery part, of
course, is how many people it takes to make "most," and whether some of those people
count more than others.
'5 Cf Green v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (declaring that the concurring Justice would disregard plain text when it
produced an "irrational" or "unconstitutional" result).
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B. Collaboration or Federal Control?
My focus in this Article is on § 1983 challenges to state
action that is contrary to a federal statute or regulation. Thus,
the vast majority of cases that would be affected by any change
in § 1983 doctrine would come in the realm of what I refer to
here as "collaborative" regulation - where the state regulates
jointly with, or subject to the supervision of, the federal
government.
Collaboration occurs in two broad forms. Generally,
federal law establishes the framework of the regulatory sphere
- pollution control, for example - and within that sphere,
invites or commands states to regulate their citizens with
varying degrees of autonomy for the state. As presently
constituted, the affected areas of regulation are collaborative in
a second sense as well. Because there is no private right of
action, when the state and the federal government disagree,
the dispute is usually resolved informally, through discussion
and compromise between the two sets of actors. Some disputes
take place in the shadow of sanctions, many of which are
themselves relatively informal, such as the power to withhold
grants, needed information, or aid in enforcement. The specific
questions for this subpart will be: How do states fare in their
informal, collaborative relationship with federal agencies? If
the answer, as we might guess, is "poorly," 'are private rights of
action a viable alternative?
1. Federal Dominance
One aspect of the potential for federal domination of
collaborative federal-state regulatory relationships is relatively
obvious. State regulatory authority often exists only by
sufferance of the United States, and in the shadow of the
Supremacy Clause and preemption.'" States are therefore
limited in their ability to take alternative paths to underlying
problems.'57 For example, the states and the federal government
ostensibly work together in regulating health care, and both
have a strong interest in providing decent and affordable
'5, See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225-26 (2000). For a
discussion of preemption as a legal entity separate and apart from the Supremacy
Clause, see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767
(1994).
117 See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values,
71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 714-18 (1991).
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health care to everyone. But the federal government has
asserted exclusive control over group health plans,"
frustrating any state that wants to attack the health care
problem through innovative regulations of group health
benefits.'""
A more subtle, but probably more widespread, problem
is that a collaborative enterprise between federal and state
bureaucrats is not the same as a collaboration between federal
and state governments. The problems identified, and solutions
proposed, by state regulators may be far removed from what an
elected state official would say in the same circumstances.16
True, the states retain some power to shape how their own
bureaucrats will be made to answer to popular will'' - for
instance, how bureaucrats will be selected and removed. ""
However, the ultimate relationship between state popular will
and bureaucratic outcome will depend not only on these
structural devices but also on a complex web of interactions
between the bureaucrats of each state and the federal
bureaucrats, who will be drawing information from and
responding not to one set of state concerns, but to fifty, thus
diluting the ability of a single state to exercise its own will."'
A related complaint about how federal cooperation
undermines state control draws on the argument that some
cooperative workplaces, rather than empowering workers,
"s See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
'"9 See John Kincaid, Foreword: The New Federalism Context of the New
Judicial Federalism, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 913, 933 (1995) (noting 439 explicit statutory
preemptions of state law, and an unknown number of additional preemptions through
regulation and court decision).
6 See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules,
Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1208 (2000)
(noting that in system of shared authority between state and federal bureaucracies,
key decisions are made at levels of administration of both governments that are
inaccessible to public oversight); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1485, 1553-54 (1994) [hereinafter Kramer, Understanding Federalism]
(claiming that expert regulators at state level are likely to follow guidance of federal
fellow experts over that of non-expert state political superiors); Larry D. Kramer,
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 215, 284 (2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Political Safeguards] (same); cf. David
Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers that Be: The Constitutional Purposes
of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 386-87 (1987) (arguing that
bureaucrats are motivated by their own purposes in ways that frustrate political
controls).
61 See generally Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State
Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297, 303-20 (1986).
' See Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure
and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 557-59 (2001).
i6 See Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 160, at 1553-54.
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instead result in management co-opting the shop floor.'"
Similarly, collaboration between federal and state regulators
may simply cause state officials to throw over their own views
in favor of the federal outlook. To be clear, I am not arguing
that federal agencies will necessarily intend to suborn their
state counterparts. Still, co-optation can come by accident.
State bureaucrats have incentives to become "yes men" (or
women), parroting back what they believe the federal agency
wants to hear. For instance, an agency may condition federal
grants on criteria crafted by the federal agency before it has
consulted with the officers in the field, or at the beginning of a
new regulatory enterprise about which not much information is
available. If the agency then evaluates the grantee based on
how well it met the preestablished criteria, it might become
very difficult for the program to evolve in new directions.
Incentives also influence individual behavior. Federal work is
more prestigious, and often better compensated, than
comparable state positions. State bureaucrats might act
according to the perceived expectations of the prospective
federal employer, rather than striking out in new directions or
zealously representing the interests of the state. Even workers
who are not looking to get hired can be influenced by the
institutional culture of the federal bureaucracy. ""
Thus, collaborative administration between state and
federal agencies can reduce both the representation of a state's
interests and a state's control over its governmental
institutions. For example, suppose that a state's governor and
legislature have a strong preference for vigorous enforcement
of a particular regulation, one whose enforcement the state
must share with the federal government. Suppose further that
the professional staff of the federal and state bureaucracies
prefer nonenforcement, and that political leadership of the
federal agency is ambivalent." To be more concrete, consider
the Department of Housing and Urban Development during
"; See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power,
Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1457-59 (1993); NLRB v.
Pa. Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1938).
65 Cf. Diller, supra note 160, at 1209-10 & n.450 (noting study that
demonstrated that cooperation between agency and its contractors tended to
undermine the independent thinking and problem-solving of the contractor, which
instead came simply to "police compliance" with norms generated by the agency).
1w, I consider the relationship between a federal agency's professional staff
and its political leadership more closely a bit later. See infra text accompanying notes
215-218.
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the Reagan administration. HUD shared, with state and local
housing finance agencies and public housing authorities, the
responsibility to monitor the financing and upkeep of federally
subsidized low-income housing.'7 Despite widespread
agreement in some state governments that close supervision of
privately owned low-income housing was desirable, none was
ever in the offing."' Billions of dollars disappeared illicitly, with
state governments largely left to pick up the resulting housing
burden.'
2. Is Reinvented Government the Answer?
The recent work of several scholars on the nature of
joint public and private regulation suggests that the prevalence
of collaborative regulation may itself be a solution to the
problem of federal domination."' Collaboration with the states
can have a number of benefits for the federal agency. State
regulators, like workers on an assembly line, may be more
familiar with the day-to-day operations and problems of a
regulated industry, and therefore have better capacity to
implement policy, and identify places where policy needs
improvement."' By avoiding directly adversarial relationships,
negotiation may also extend the ability of the federal agency to
win cooperation from otherwise recalcitrant state officials.' A
167 See 12 U.S.C. § 1701q(g)-(j) (2000) (setting forth HUD Secretary's
responsibilities in supervising housing assistance for the elderly); id. § 1701s(b), (e)
(same, for rent supplement payments on behalf of low-income tenants, including those
living in state- or locally-financed homes); id § 17151(f) (same, for housing receiving
federal mortgage insurance); id. § 1715z-l(b), (e), (o), (p), (s)(6) (same, for housing
receiving "interest reduction" subsidies from federal government); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437c-1,
1437f (2000) (authorizing Secretary to enter into contracts with public housing
agencies to establish public housing); id. § 8003 (same, to create "congregate housing"
for the elderly and disabled).
' See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AUDIT OF SECTION 8 MODERATE REHABILITATION PROGRAM,
at iii (1989) (summarizing the OIG's findings that one of HUD's cooperative low-income
housing programs operated with "little or no documentation or accountability").
'69 For a useful overview of the dozen or so overlapping HUD abuses, and the
resulting impact on housing for low-income families, see Michael Allen Wolf, HUD and
Housing in the 1990s: Crises in Affordability and Accountability, 18 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 545, 553-70 (1991).
17" For prominent positive descriptive accounts of collaborative regulation, see
AL GORE, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS 29-30
(1993); Freeman, supra note 131, at 549; Rubin, supra note 131, at 785-88.
171 See Freeman, supra note 131, at 571.
72 See Rubin, supra note 131, at 783; Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering
Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 411, 412 (2000).
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rational federal regulator, this theory goes, won't kill the goose
that lays golden eggs. If independent state officials provide the
information and flexibility critical to a federal agency's mission,
the federal agency is unlikely to risk losing the benefits of
collaboration in order to win policy disputes. More critically, to
the extent that state feedback provides the raw information for
future federal policy, the states are, in effect, steering their
own ship.
Professors Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel have taken
these arguments one step further, proposing an integrated
federal, state, and private regulatory structure in which local
units work independently to solve social problems defined
broadly at the national level.'" As the local units gather
information about the nature of these problems, and the best
methods for solving them, the federal agency pools the data
and analyzes it for the "best practices," sometimes discovering
in the process that the nature of the problem itself must evolve
in light of the new information.'74 Dorf and Sabel's system is
"experimentalist," because it constantly evaluates both ends
and means, and also "democratic," because it distributes design
authority throughout the regulatory apparatus and enhances
deliberation.'7
Significantly, for our purposes, Dorf and Sabel claim to
solve many of the problems of joint federal-state regulation. For
instance, they argue that their process of rolling standards
creates room for local innovations, and gives states influence in
the process of developing national ends and norms.'6 Moreover,
they claim that their design enhances agency accountability,
not only through direct public participation and deliberation,
but also by exposing local agencies to competitive forces - that
is, to information revealing that other localities have reached
for the same ends more effectively. '
Notwithstanding these optimistic views of shared
regulatory power, many commentators are still highly critical
of collaboration. "' To some, it is no more than "capture" writ
'" See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
171 See id. at 299-301, 354.
17' See id. at 313, 351-53.
176 See id. at 322, 347, 444.
117 See id. at 314, 321.
17s See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative Law Under
Siege: Is Germany a Model?, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1279, 1283, 1301 (1994); William Funk,
Bargaining Toward the New Millenium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of
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large.'7- Dorf and Sabel admit that their scheme is, potentially,
open to "obstruction" by participants who give misleading
information, attempt to game the system, or use it as a vehicle
for expanding already-existing power inequities." Their non-
judicial solutions - to rely on "internal dissenters" who reveal
bad performance, and to put their faith in benchmarking and
rolling best practices to reveal and disincentivize gaming
behavior 8 ' - are unlikely to satisfy all critics."'
Nonetheless, to the extent that the optimistic view of
collaboration correctly predicts that states retain significant
autonomy in a shared regulatory environment, one might
justifiably argue that any additional protections that a court
could provide, in the name of federalism, would be largely
redundant. Thus, the next subpart examines the place for
private rights of action under both the bright and gloomy
descriptions of collaboration.
3. Collaboration and Private Rights of Action
Collaborative regulation's claim to serve federalism
values may still leave a place for agency-created private rights
of action in the federalism equation. For those who remain
dubious of how much autonomy states retain in an overlapping
system of regulation, private rights of action sidestep serious
dangers that state regulators will become more responsive to
their federal counterparts than to the state electorate. I
elaborate that point in part IV.B.3.b. First, however, I argue in
part IV.B.3.a. that private rights of action are a necessary
the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1374-88 (1997); Seidenfeld, supra note 172, at
413.
179 USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Posner, J.); Seidenfeld, supra note 172, at 428.
"s Dorf & Sabel, supra note 173, at 348-49.
See id. at 348-53. In other words, Dorf and Sabel expect that careful
measures of good performance - benchmarking - will demonstrate when an entity is
failing to perform as well as others who are pursuing the same goals. Consumers of the
entity's "product" - example, people who use the public service it provides - may put
pressure on the entity to meet or exceed the standards of performance set by other local
participants. This is part of their theory of "rolling best practices," the process by which
each autonomous unit borrows the best of what the others do in order to match one
another's performance. Thus, they theorize that self-dealing and obstruction will show
up on the bottom line, and that in a system where there is genuine competition for the
best results, those subpar results will be punished.
8"2 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 178, at 1283 (arguing that collaborative
systems fail to resolve problems of distributive justice); Seidenfeld, supra note 172, at
413, 448 (noting potential of collaborative model to serve as a tool for strategic
advantage).
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feature of more optimistic collaborative schemes, so that the
federalism benefits of one go hand-in-hand with the other.
a. Private Rights of Action and the
Optimistic View of Collaboration
Suppose, first, we believe that reinvented government
empowers states. In order to reap that benefit, though, we will
also need judicial involvement. Some optimistic collaborative
models also imagine a clear-cut role for private enforcement.
For example, Dorf and Sabel acknowledge that courts may be
necessary to protect citizens' rights to participate in their
collaborative system against intimidation, "clientelism," and
company unionism." Courts also help to assure that
government, rather than growing slack, will continually have
to justify its behavior with reference to the best available
values and data, or, as they put it, "elaborate fundamental
principles while assessing the practical consquences of
different rules of order.""
Other collaborative theorists note that, like any set of
deal-makers, collaborators need guarantees of enforceability in
order to make deals worth bargaining for.' 4 Nor are the
regulators a satisfactory candidate for enforcement duties,
since they are often one of the parties to the dispute and, in
any event, the entire design of the collaborative system is to
relieve agencies of the burdens of enforcement. One recent
commentator has suggested that collaborative schemes should
be enforceable through common-law contract." Private entities
who participate in designing a collaborative scheme could be
made third-party beneficiaries to contracts between the
principal regulator and intermediary regulators or service-
providers.
Unfortunately, the contract enforcement proposal will
fail. Many beneficiary groups cannot afford to hire counsel to
enforce a breach of contract. Suits challenging administrative
action or involving interpretations of regulations are typically
'8 Dorf& Sabel, supra note 173, at 405,459-64.
'84 Id. at 388-89.
185 See Freeman, supra note 131, at 667; Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 234 (1986); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 178, at 1280;
Seidenfeld, supra note 172, at 424.
'm See Freeman, supra note 131, at 667-71; Jody Freeman, The Contracting
State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 201-07 (2000).
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lengthy, complex, expensive, and unsuccessful. ' If the
plaintiffs are only seeking "specific performance," and do not
have meaningful damages to pay a contingency fee, finding
counsel will be very difficult." Once it becomes apparent that
the agreements struck collaboratively are binding, in effect,
only on the parties least able to enforce them in court, the
collaborative process will fall apart.
The contractual enforcement plan is workable, though,
if the complaining parties can get the benefits of the fee-
shifting provisions available to prevailing parties under §
1983. ' As discussed below, § 1988, the mechanism for shifting
fees in § 1983 claims, provides far less than a guarantee that
counsel will be available to aggrieved parties."' Indeed, § 1988
primarily helps entities that already have a certain minimum
of resources, public support, and organizational acumen. But
those are exactly the same parties that have the sophistication
and initiative to seek negotiations with federal and state
regulators, and probably the only parties that have the
influence and persuasiveness to win actual commitments."'
Section 1988, then, is good enough to keep at the table the
parties who are likely to be there in the first place.
Under this view, private rights of action under § 1983
are an essential feature of the federalism-preserving system of
collaborative regulation. First, by creating a right of action, a
federal agency in effect carves out a space in which enforceable
deals can be struck between all parties. For example, a state
housing finance agency is more likely to be able to attract
community support for a new development, and private
investment dollars to build it, if the parties are confident their
bargain will not change once the beams have begun to go up.
Agency-created private rights of action can help to bring
about genuinely collaborative systems in another sense, as
well. Dorf and Sabel acknowledge that one major weakness of
their plan lies in identifying transitional rules. They have no
clear answer to the question of how to switch from the current,
(in their eyes) disfunctional system into their experimental one,
other than by fumbling half-steps, each (they hope) better than
18 See infra text accompanying notes 265-267.
188 Id.
189 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
'9 See infra text accompanying notes 263-271.
"' See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look
at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 1210 (1994).
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the status quo.'2 One possible transition begins by allowing an
agency to make the availability of private rights of action
contingent on exhaustion of state remedies, assuming that the
agency has "certified" or otherwise examined the state's
solutions and determined that those remedies offer a genuine
solution to the problems its regulations are aimed at solving.
Exhaustion requirements give states the incentive to develop
remedies. 9' Agency oversight and rolling benchmarking could
also make state remedies not only a half-hearted replacement
for private suit, but also a genuinely experimental and evolving
process, integrating citizens and other private interest groups
into the regulatory process, and injecting local information into
federal norms.
b. Private Rights of Action and the
Dim View of Collaboration
The skeptical view of reinvented government envisions
federal and state bureaucrats working together to escape state
political controls. In that scenario, private litigation breaks
open the bureaucratic beehive, exposing internal behavior to
outside control once more. " For example, a private suit could
offer a route for states to bypass moribund bureaucracies and
revitalize regulations that a state deems to have been
underenforced. 9t At the same time, a private suit can be a
vehicle to check overaggressive state regulators - for example,
if federal regulations seem to contemplate that a permit to
broadcast, cut timber, or release hot water be granted under
circumstances rather broader than the state agency seems to
allow.'"
See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 173, at 463-64, 469.
'9:' See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 532-33 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
'q4 See Jaffe, supra note 115, at 1044-45.
195 There is some data to suggest that, even if judicial review does not directly
alter regulatory outcomes, it can produce more care and effort on the part of state
regulators. See F. Andrew Hanssen, Independent Courts and Administrative Agencies:
An Empirical Analysis of the States, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 534, 534 (2000).
' Of course, judicial resolution of regulatory questions comes in for a world of
criticism, and much of it is merited. On the other hand, as I will explain in Part V,
infra, many of the critic's complaints are more properly directed at the traditional, and
inadequate, remedies afforded by standard administrative law and due process
challenges to irrational state action. Most of those critiques can be met by the
particular features of agency-enabled rights of action under § 1983, and for the most
part the rest can be solved with sensible assumptions about the availability of those
rights.
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The critical question is whether state political autonomy
is enhanced by taking enforcement decisions out of the hands of
unaccountable bureaucrats and putting them into the hands of
unaccountable judges."7 Section 1983 claims, however, can be
brought in state court,'0 where state elected officials have
complete control over the form of judicial responsibility to
public will.'" Many state judges are elected; others are
appointed but serve limited terms subject to reappointment."
Section 1983 litigation, then, offers the state community an
opportunity to shift enforcement disputes into a forum
controlled by the people of the state."0 While state agency
defendants could certainly remove suits against themselves to
federal court, the state could not seriously claim that it was
deprived of sovereignty as a result of the litigation choices of its
own officers."' In any event, state attorneys general, as elected
'9' Again, by hypothesis, we are working within the set of textualist
assumptions. Although there are a variety of plausible arguments about why judges
are "accountable," or about why traditional notions of accountability are not especially
relevant to judicial legitimacy, I presume that such arguments are not persuasive to
the textualist.
'' See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 358, 367-70 (1990).lf) See id. at 373 ("The States . . . have great latitude to establish the
structure and jurisdiction of their own courts."); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 53 (1982); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's
Foot: The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121,
1167 (1996); cf. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783-84 & n.12 (2002)
(arguing that elected state judges are part of "the enterprise of representative
government").
"1" See White, 536 U.S. at 790-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Steven P. Croley,
The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 689, 725 (1995).
.11 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 71 n.26 (1991); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation
and Judicial Selection: A View from the Federalist Papers, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1669,
1669 (1988). But see Croley, supra note 200, at 726-42, 787 (arguing that elected judges
undermine democratic values).
"" Several of the grizzled veteran litigators (including one federal judge) who
commented on an earlier draft of this Article remarked that, in their experience, few §
1983 claims were ever brought in state court. While I do not doubt that claim is
accurate, I think it is a state of affairs that is unlikely to continue. Until very recently,
plaintiffs could routinely bring both § 1983 and supplemental state law (such as state
APA) challenges together in federal court. Although in theory the Eleventh
Amendment could shield the state from defending state law claims in federal court, see
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120-21 (1984), as a practical
matter state attorney generals' offices had no incentive to litigate similar sets of claims
in two separate fora. Plaintiffs therefore rarely faced a choice between their preferred
forum for federal claims, which evidently was federal court, and the problem of dual
litigation. Recently, though, the Supreme Court has clarified that, while sovereign
immunity may sometimes be waived by state legislators, state litigators cannot, merely
by failing to raise a jurisdictional defense, expand the scope of a federal court's
supplemental jurisdiction. See Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 539-
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officials themselves, are likely to respond to popular
preferences for state judicial resolution of important state
problems." :'
Finally, federal agencies can themselves ensure that
states retain control over the resolution of disputes that
produce § 1983 suits. Section 1983 plaintiffs do not have to
exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before
bringing suit in federal court."°' That is a sensible policy, in
general, because, as a vehicle for enforcing federal law on what
might be recalcitrant states, § 1983 in effect presumes the
possible inadequacy of state fora."' A federal court, with little
data about the effectiveness of state courts in enforcing federal
law, and at best only an indirect connection to popular norms of
"effectiveness," is in a poor position to determine otherwise. A
federal agency, however, might craft a regulation making a
private right of action under § 1983 contingent on exhaustion of
state remedies certified by the agency as "effective.""w. The
agency is well positioned to evaluate what encompasses
effective dispute resolution, and, if inspired by the Dorf and
Sabel model, might permit wide experimentation in methods,
and encourage rolling benchmarking to improve their quality
over time.
One might object that these benefits are unattainable
unless the relevant federal agency chooses to act. Why would a
542 (2002). As a result, federal district courts are beginning to dismiss supplemental
state law claims against sovereign defendants on their own motion. See, e.g., Bowers v.
NCAA, 188 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477 & n.2 (D.N.J. 2002). The result is that plaintiffs are
now rather more likely to bring their § 1983 claims challenging state administrative
actions in state court, so as to avoid the decision either to abandon state law claims or
conduct a parallel litigation in order to pursue them.
20:1 Even if a suit does end up in federal court, it might not necessarily be
decided by a federal judge. Litigation against state agencies can be republican-forcing;
that is, by focusing public attention on decisions that normally receive relatively little
attention from all but the most interested voters, a lawsuit may encourage debate and,
ultimately, a settlement or other resolution prior to final judicial determination. See III
DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 70, § 185, at 187; Macey, supra note 185, at 256;
Seidenfeld, supra note 172, at 459; Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 68, at 1294. As I
explain below, the majority of § 1983 litigation against state officials will be brought by
.public interest" organizations or large corporations, both of whom are interested in,
and capable of, fostering public solutions to private disputes. See infra text
accompanying notes 263-273. As a result, § 1983 suits, even more than, say generic
state law claims against the state government are amenable to negotiated outcomes.
.2'" See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
.(.' See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1980).
A court reviewing such a regulation could find that it is "reasonable," even
though contrary to the general rule for § 1983 litigation, because it effectuates the
imputed intention of Congress under the Bass rationale.
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federal agency care about state political control over state
bureaucracies? One possible answer is that the states
themselves demand it. Federal agencies, at least at their
highest levels, are somewhat responsible to the President, and
interpretive authority is highly centralized in the most political
regions of the cabinet." ' States might use their national
political power to prevent federal agency behavior that would
tend to undermine their ability to control their own
instrumentalities of government. Yet state political influence is
also a challenge to private rights of action; if the states are
strong enough to protect themselves, what need have they for
judicial protection? The next subpart analyzes these two
potentially competing threads.
207 There are several factors that enhance the influence of the President over
agency decision making, at least at the upper echelons of the executive agencies. Most
prominent among these is the influence of the Office of Management and Budget,
which pursuant to executive order now has authority to consider most significant
regulation for its "cost-benefit" effectiveness. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 70, § 7.9
at pp. 352-53; Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB
in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986). Major policy decisions in each
executive agency, such as the issuance of formal regulation, must be "cleared" through
the office of the Secretary. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, White House Rejected a
Stricter E.P.A. Alternative to the President's Clear Skies Plan, N.Y. TIMES, April 28,
2002, at A26 (reporting that the Bush administration rejected implementation plan for
Clean Air Act proposed by the EPA). The Secretary and his or her chief deputies are
appointed directly by the President, and, unlike many parliamentary governments,
there is a very strong correlation between the general ideological positions a President
campaigns on and the views of his cabinet. Through the Attorney General's power to
render opinions "binding" on the rest of the executive branch, the President can
centralize interpretive authority, and the Solicitor General's power to refuse to appeal
can serve the same function when the agencies litigate. See American Bar Association,
A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 83 (2002);
Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary
Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337 (1993). Finally, the President exerts significant
control over agencies through public relations. President George W. Bush, for example,
centralized the press secretaries and information offices of all of the executive agencies,
see Dan Balz & Mike Allen, Hughes to Leave White House; Key Bush Aide Wants to
Return to Texas With Family, WASH. POST, April 23, 2002, at Al, so that agencies
would have difficulty generating public sentiment on their own, independent of the
administration's will.
At the same time, one has to acknowledge that the power of the President
and his staff to monitor developments in the agencies, especially at the field level, is
limited. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 70, § 7.9, at 356-57; see also Eric Schmitt,
Administration Split on Local Role in Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 2002, at Al
(describing White House officials "blindsided" by ruling of Office of Legal Counsel on
powers of local law enforcement agencies to aid in antiterrorism efforts). For an
interesting example of Cabinet secretaries themselves caught flat-footed by major
developments in the field, see Katharine Q. Seelye, Snowmobile Letter Surprises E.P.A.
Leader and Interior Chief, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2002, at A14. Nonetheless, it seems
likely that private rights of action are sufficiently important to draw the
administration's attention, and, if not, it is almost certain that prospective defendants
would do so.
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C. Does State Political Power Make the Judiciary
Irrelevant?
Perhaps the most substantial counter to the claim that
collaborative rulemaking makes serious inroads into state
autonomy hinges on state political power. If states have
political influence over the upper levels of federal agencies, it
might be expected that they would use their influence to
preserve their control over state governmental processes. In
Professor Wechsler's famous formulation, state influence arises
out of structural interdependence between state and federal
governments. "" In that view, the disproportionate power of
small states in the Senate, as well as the fact that
congressional representatives are chosen on a state-by-state
basis with electoral qualifications controlled by the states,
gives states enough power to defend themselves against federal
encroachments."°9
More recently, Professor Larry Kramer has proposed an
alternative sort of interdependence, in which federal officials
depend for their initial and continuing political livelihood on
support from national political parties, which in turn draw
much of their strength from field-level state parties.2 ' Federal
officials' indebtedness to state officials, as well as their likely
philosophical sympathy with their former peers in the state
government, lead federal lawmakers to be protective enough of
state governmental autonomy that no additional judicial
protections are required.2 '
One set of Professor Kramer's critics has argued that,
even if his premise of political interdependence is accurate, his
conclusion that interdependence leads to more protection for
states is not.12 According to these critics, states will not
necessarily use their power to protect state governmental
processes. Instead, state actors may well wish to pursue short-
term policy goals, regardless of the consequences for state
218 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543 (1954).
209 See id. at 559.
210 See Kramer, Political Safeguards, supra note 160, at 279-85.
211 See id. at 280, 285.
212 See Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 954-56 (2001); Saikrishna B. Prakash
& John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 1459, 1484-88 (2001).
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governance."3 Since it is state political autonomy, not simply
the expression of momentary political preferences, that is the
heart of federalism, this would be a fatal flaw.2 4
As explained in the subparts that follow, regardless of
one's view on the connection between federal/state
interdependence and state autonomy, private rights of action
are superior to negotiation between state and federal agencies.
Under Professor Kramer's view, political accountability will
ensure that agencies will only create private rights of action
where it will improve state political independence. Indeed,
states can use their political power to resolve many of what, to
the federalist, are the shortcomings of collaborative
federal/state regulation. Additionally, the safeguards provided
by state sovereign immunity and related doctrines serve states
better than the rough and arbitrary competition that results
when states wield the power of federal agencies against one
another.
1. When the Safeguards Work
Assume both that states have influence over national
politics and also that states will use that power to promote
policies that enhance their own autonomy. But if it is politics
that empowers states, then state influence extends only as far
as the reach of political influence over administrative activity.
Certainly major initiatives or policy shifts, especially if issued
with full notice and comment, are firmly in the hands of the
administration."' As other commentators have pointed out,
however, the activity of field staff in carrying out day-to-day
review of state activity is largely insulated from effective
political oversight by bureau heads."' Top supervisors might
lack the technical expertise to effectively review decisions by
field staff, as in the case of the Environmental Protection
Agency, or a bureaucracy might be so huge that close oversight
is simply impractical, such as in the case of the Department of
2,3 See Baker, supra note 212, at 955, 967; Prakash & Yoo, supra note 212, at
1478-79; Greve, supra note 85, at 897, 904-05.
214 See Kramer, Political Safeguards, supra note 160, at 222-23; Baker, supra
note 212, at 959; Prakash & Yoo, supra note 212, at 1477-79.
2 15 See supra note 207.
216 See, e.g., Diller, supra note 160, at 1208-09; Julie A. Roin,
Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and Other Regulations, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 351,
353-54 (1999); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1555-57 (1992).
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Health and Human Services."7 Slowdowns in the nomination
and confirmation process can leave career staff in charge for
long stretches. Additionally, because much of the erosion of
state autonomy happens at the field level, the daily
interactions between federal and state bureaucrats are the
main way in which the state's objectives, perhaps initially
shared by its own appointees and professionals, slowly blend
into the shared view of the joint federal/state bureaucracy.
In response, rational state officials will look for ways to
counteract the relative unresponsiveness of professional
administrators. Private rights of action present one powerful
instrument for shifting enforcement power from the hands of
federal and state bureaucrats into institutions more directly
within control of the state electorate."' Rights of action, at least
as I have argued for them, could only be created or undone by
regulations issued through notice and comment. As such, they
would lie squarely within the reach of the upper, political
echelons of federal agencies - at the apex of state political
power, far from the nadir of the field."9 While private rights of
action are not the perfect tool for recapturing the benefits of
federalism, there would not seem to be many alternatives for
the states. Thus, when state and federal elected officials are
politically interdependent, private rights of action under § 1983
serve the interest of state autonomy.
217 One might argue that the relative distance of political appointees from
field-level decisions does not necessarily dilute the political accountability of field
decisions. We could imagine a well-designed agency, for example, where field staff have
carefully designed missions, and exercise their discretion mostly in the process of
collecting information, analyzing it rationally, and responding with a choice among
authorized alternatives. The problem is that "analyzing it rationally" usually involves
what are actually political assumptions, such as how to rank two or more goals
established by superiors, whether or not to make assumptions at the top or bottom
ends of plausible ranges, whether or not to make aggressive accounting or other
mathematical assumptions, and the like. See Thomas 0. McGarrity, Regulatory
Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1243, 1299-1301 (1987). The result is
that important policy decisions may be not only inaccessible, but also invisible, to the
public or their political agents. Id.
218 See supra text accompanying notes 194-206.
219 See supra note 207. On the generally pro-democratic benefits of the notice
and comment process, see Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements,
Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the
Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1373-74 (1992); Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative
Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 402-03.
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2. When the Safeguards Fail
The alternative view of political interdependence posits
that states view federalism instrumentally, so that they tend to
use their political access for short-term gains that do not
necessarily enhance their own autonomy in the long run." In
other words, states, like other market actors, manipulate
regulators in order to impose externalities on other market
participants, including other states."' The alternative view
might also take note of the fact that states can have uneven
political influence. States might all value sovereignty equally,
but those having more influence at a particular time might
realize more of it at the expense of their less powerful
neighbors. Thus, "downwind" states might demand that the
EPA force state regulators in "upwind" states to tighten
inspection and approval of private polluters." ' Under this
alternative view of the world, § 1983 litigation safeguards state
institutional autonomy over agency enactment of momentary
policy preferences urged by more politically powerful states.
220 See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1488, 1500 (1992); Prakash & Yoo, supra note 212, at 1478-79.
2'2 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and CoOptation,
92 YALE L.J. 1344, 1345 (1983). For a classic analysis of the externality problem, see
William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974). Even Cary's critics acknowledge that interstate competition poses a serious
threat of externalities. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
222 See Jennifer Lee, 7 States to Sue E.P.A. Over Standards on Air Pollution,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 2003, at A25; see also Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 213 F.3d
663, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Policy
and Federal Structure: A Comparison of the United States and Germany, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1587, 1609-11 (1994).
223 To see the difference between institutional autonomy and policy
preferences, consider the upwind and downwind states again. Viewed as a discrete
transaction, the state emissions standard question looks distinctly unfair to the
downwind states; not only do they lose capital to the upwind states, where the cost of
doing business is cheaper, but they also have to breathe in the resulting pollution.
(Thanks to the transaction costs of buying off the upwind states-not least of which is
the difficulty that the states, because they cannot make interstate compacts without
federal approval, see Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981), must involve the EPA
in any meaningful deal-there is no ready Coasian solution to the downwind states'
woes. See Michigan, 213 F.3d at 676 & n.3.) And all because the upwind states, for the
most part, happen to be politically important swing states, while the downwind states
are, for the most part, reliably Democratic. In the long run, though, the, ahem, winds of
fortune will reverse. State autonomy gains, measured as a realization of policy
preferences over those of other states, largely sum out to zero over time. The same can't
necessarily be said of a system that encourages federal control over state instruments
of government. See Kramer, Political Safeguards, supra note 160, at 222-23;
McConnell, supra note 220, at 1507-11. Thus, a state that pushes control over some
issues into the federal realm to win today's battle loses autonomy in the long run. I
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The safeguards of § 1983 litigation are superior to
agency interaction for two reasons: the difficulty of forcing a
state to pay damages in a § 1983 suit and the comparative ease
with which federal agencies can affect the state purse. As a
general matter, the safeguards grow out of limits on suits
against states and state officers imposed by the Supreme
Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence. The exact scope of
those limitations is worth exploring in some detail.
A private litigant has a handful of options in bringing a
§ 1983 suit to compel state agency action (or inaction).
Although the plaintiff cannot name the state directly, she can
sometimes sue a state-created entity in its own name.22 ' More
commonly, the plaintiff sues state or state entity officers in
their "official capacity" - in effect, suing the uniform or title,
not the person."' Suits against officers in their official capacity
may seek only prospective injunctive relief."' Finally, plaintiffs
can sue officers in their individual capacity, for both damages
and injunctive relief.21 States often indemnify their officers for
individual capacity suits, so that the plaintiff may, in theory,
be able to influence the state through its pocketbook by means
of individual capacity suits."'
In fact, though, it would be almost impossible to force a
state to pay damages for violating a duty imposed by federal
regulations. After a long history of equivocation, the Supreme
Court now seems to have settled on the principle that the
states have complete control over whether a state-created
entity is an "arm of the state," entitled to the state's own
sovereignty.' If so, the entity is completely immune from suit
therefore focus my analysis on long-term protection for the structures of state
government, rather than temporary wins or losses.
224 See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 41-48 (1994).
225 See generally RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1124-26 (4 t' ed. 1996) (discussing litigation
strategies for suits against states and state policies).
226 See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
227 See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-26, 31 (1991).
228 But see Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and
the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 373-80 (2000) (arguing
that the effect of liability for individual officer torts on the state's behavior is "simply
indeterminate").
229 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-31 (1997) (citing
Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)); Bowers v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 171 F. Supp. 2d 389, 401-02 (D.N.J. 2001) (explaining Doe as
holding that federal courts must honor states' decisions to treat a state-created entity
as an arm of the state entitled to its sovereign immunity). But cf. McMillian v. Monroe
County, 520 U.S. 781, 804-05 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
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under § 1983, regardless of what relief is sought.' :" In order to
overcome the qualified immunity of state officers sued in their
individual capacity, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable
officer would have known she was violating clearly established
law at the time of the plaintiffs injury.'" Federal regulations,
even those that have been narrowed by the agency to make
them suitable for private enforcement, will often be too open-
textured, or too complex, to describe as "clearly established." It
will also often be difficult for a plaintiff who has suffered
injuries as a result of a state's administration of federal
regulations to connect her injuries to the actual person
responsible for the state's decision. That is, since § 1983
requires "personal direction or . . . actual knowledge and
acquiescence" for individual liability,"' most plaintiffs will only
be able to make out a case against the low-level field staff or
enforcement officials. But a jury may find that a reasonable
field staffer would have no reason to know what procedure
federal law imposed on the state agency.':':'
In contrast, federal agencies have considerable power to
pull the states by their purse-strings. Most obviously, many
agencies are authorized to control the allocation of grant funds
or grant-in-aid dollars. Agencies can, and sometimes do, exact
conditions from the states in exchange. : Some regulatory
majority opinion implies that a state cannot "insulate counties and municipalities from
... liability by change-the-label devices"). It may be that both Justice Ginsburg and the
District Court in Bowers are right; although a state can use largely formalistic labels to
grant immunity to many state entities, counties and cities, although creatures of state
law, might be special exceptions. The rationale for that distinction might rest on the
long judicial pedigree for such exceptions, see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529
(1890), or a historical claim that no matter what the state might say about such
matters, towns and counties simply have never been thought of as, and therefore
cannot be made, sovereign entities. But cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 124 n.34 (1984) (suggesting that suit against local entity
might be barred by sovereign immunity if state would foot the bill).
.:See Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71 (1989); id. at 85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001). Individuals, however,
have no qualified immunity in suits solely for injunctive relief. See Pulliam v. Allen,
466 U.S. 522, 539-40 (1984).
2"2 Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 n.29 (1981)); see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-77 (1976);
Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994); Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675, 679
(5th Cir. 1980); Vinson v. Richmond Police Dep't, 567 F.2d 263, 265 (4th Cir. 1977);
Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 39-40 (1st Cir. 1977).
2*' The courts of appeals have taken differing views of the extent to which the
qualified immunity of a defendant can be a jury question. See Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d
271, 278 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2002) (summarizing circuit split).
See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 431.53 (2002) (requiring states to provide
transportation to Medicaid beneficiaries in order for state to receive federal Medicaid
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schemes allow agencies to impose fines or other monetary
sanctions, such as back pay awards, against states. Admittedly,
compliance with court-ordered injunctions can cost a state as
much or more than a damages award."" The premise of the
Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence, however, appears to
be that the possibility of money flowing from the public
treasury more directly threatens the state's control over its
governmental processes than do injunctions. '
Taken together, these doctrines provide a significant
measure of protection for state institutional autonomy simply
not present in the everyday workings of the federal agencies. If
one is dubious about the value of the political
interconnectedness of federal and state governments in
protecting that autonomy, all other things being equal, one
should prefer an enforcement regime that includes the
safeguards of the courtroom at least some of the time."' A state
would much rather defend a suit asserting that its policies
interfered with the right to a free and appropriate public
education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act,"" than face suspension of its federal education dollars by
the Department of Education."9
Naturally, that phrase, "all other things being equal," is
a significant fudge factor. Judicial dispute resolution has its
detractors, especially in the administrative context. Some
funds); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.110 - 300.756 (2002) (setting forth highly detailed
requirements for states who wish to receive funding under Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act).
23'5 See Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional
Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as
Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 754 (1988).
236 See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39-41 (1994);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665-68 & n. 11 (1974). One can imagine justifications,
albeit perhaps not especially well-grounded empirically, for this view. For example,
even if compliance with injunctive relief is, in fact, more expensive, it may be that
misperception is political reality: If state governments are more afraid of damages
awards than court orders, the loss of autonomy at the very threat of regulation may
genuinely be greater when damages are available.
2:17 This accords with the general trend that conservative scholars who believe
cooperative federalism undermines the accountability of government entities typically
favor judicial review. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70
Miss. L.J. 557, 603, 613-21 (2000).
238 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) (2000).
2 See 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (2000). Another way of putting the same point is that
the threat of a damages remedy may deter the state, out of caution, from engaging in
conduct that would not be affected by an actual injunction. Cf. Jorden v. Nat'l Guard
Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 110 (3d Cir. 1986) (relying on this argument to distinguish
immunity of military defendants from suits for damages as opposed to liability of same
defendants for suits seeking injunctive relief).
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might find the policy arguments against private rights of action
serious enough to outweigh the evident federalism benefits. A
textualist, though, should not, as policy should not enter into
her reading of the statute. That, after all, is the point of
textualism: to minimize the policy judgments of the reader in
the interpretive process. Yet, as I have argued, at least certain
policy questions must influence a proper textualist reading.
Policy objections to private rights of action that would
undermine the federalism benefits we have seen, or perhaps
that would lead to lesser individual autonomy, are permissible
considerations in a textualist analysis. Thus, the next part
considers some of the more significant criticisms of private
rights of action.
V. THE LEAST DANGEROUS REMEDY
Up until now I have proceeded without seriously
questioning the notion that agency-authorized private rights of
action are, at best, the lesser of two evils. This Part considers
critically some common complaints about private litigation.
Commentators have argued, for example, that private
rights of action compelling or challenging administrative action
place inexperienced judges with little institutional capacity for
research in the position of making expert policy decisions for
which they are inadequately prepared.4 ° Such suits, the
commentators also say, undermine the consistency and
predictability of centralized agency decision making,4 ' and sap
whatever political accountability comes from congressional or
executive control over the scope of enforcement.242 Finally, some
critics claim that the doors to the courthouse should not open
for solitary litigants whose views are far out of step with the
public interest, especially when even a sympathetic court could
never forge enough political or moral authority to see its ruling
240 See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 389 (1986); Richard J. Pierce, Agency Authority to Define the Scope
of Private Rights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996); Spence & Cross, supra note
122, at 140; Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 68, at 1208-09; Sunstein, supra note 15, at
416-17.
241 See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 68, at 1209; Peter L. Strauss, One
Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited
Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105-10, 1114
(1987); Sunstein, supra note 15, at 417.
142 See Easterbrook, supra note 120, at 1342-43; Macey, supra note 185, at
239; Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 68, at 1209, 1212.
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truly respected."" As this part illustrates, many of these
critiques, while arguably accurate with respect to litigation in
general, or under the APA, can easily be met with sensible
limitations on the availability of § 1983. Others are already
met by limitations on suits against states arising out of the
Supreme Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence.
A. Judicial Competence, or Lack Thereof
That courts lack expertise is one of the most common
criticisms of the judicial role in administration, yet it is a
problem readily solved. As several observers have pointed out,
judicial ignorance in administrative law is largely an artifact of
doctrine. The notion of judicial ignorance grows from the fact
that courts must review agency regulations before seeing their
real-world consequences, and thus courts lack data to evaluate
whether a given regulation is good policy. "'
Professors Dorf and Sabel draw on a similar insight in
situating courts within their experimentalist system. They
claim that, in a world where government policies are radically
diverse in their implementation strategies, and rigorously
analytical in comparing the effectiveness of the varying
strategies, courts can draw on that comparative data to make
policy judgments. This judicial use of real-world data frees the
process of litigation from guesswork and turns it into the more
reasoned and principled institution that we often only hope it
will be."' The proposal set forth in this Article aims at
capturing the same features. By requiring would-be litigants to
exhaust effective state remedies, agencies can foster
experimental solutions to conflicts between personal rights and
state and federal interests. Over time, that process should
produce a meaningful record to guide judicial decision making.
In situations where exhaustion is impractical or no meaningful
data will develop, and court intervention will frustrate agency
policy, the rational agency will not provide for a right of action.
Finally, if the agency nonetheless authorizes a right of action, a
court could avoid deciding by invoking Blessing's "judicial
243 See Yoo, supra note 199, at 1137-38; see also Cary Coglianese, Social
Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the Environmental Movement,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 108-09 (2001).
244 See MASHAW, supra note 124, at 164-80; Pierce, supra note 240, at 2.
245 See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 173, at 363.
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competence" prong,46 sidestepping a decision until the agency
generated more meaningful information for the court to rely
upon.
Another common complaint about transferring agency
power to courts is that federal courts, at least in their current
institutional design, are likely to disagree with one another,
producing uncertainty and over-deterrence of desirable
outcomes. 47 That criticism seems especially pointed if we expect
many § 1983 suits to be brought in state courts, with review by
the Supreme Court probably on the order of once in a
generation. Yet, again, agency control over both the scope and
content of a right of action largely forestalls problems of
inconsistency. If the agency finds that divergent court opinions
are bringing a regulated field close to chaos, it can reclaim the
reigns of enforcement."8 Or, an agency can issue a regulation
authoritatively interpreting the confusing provision.2 9
246 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997).
247 See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
248 See Pierce, supra note 240, at 10; cf. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 68, at
1227 (noting that if Congress finds level of enforcement under private right of action
disruptive of regulatory scheme, Congress can expressly modify the statute to preclude
private enforcement).
249 An agency can use interpretive regulations to, in effect, stand in the place
of the Supreme Court, resolving splits in authority. See Strauss, supra note 241, at
1121-22. Interpretive regulations do not need to go through notice and comment, and
can be issued relatively expeditiously. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing
Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 549 (2000).
Nonetheless, they are at least somewhat binding on courts, see id. at 553, especially if
couched as interpretations of other regulations, rather than of the authorizing statute,
see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965);
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). Assuming that agencies
are as alert to the problem of inconsistent interpretation, and as interested in resolving
it, when the interpretations occur outside their own ranks, there should not be much
loss of predictability in allowing courts, rather than agency staff, to make any
necessary interpretations incident to enforcement. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the centralized interpretive power of the Federal Sentencing
Commission is so effective that the Court presumes that certiorari is unnecessary in
non-constitutional questions of Sentencing Guidelines interpretation. See Braxton v.
United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1991).
On the other hand, one of the potential attractions of my proposal is that
private rights of action help to enhance the accountability of federal and state agencies.
That benefit might be lost if agencies can largely undo the effects of judicial
supervision by relatively non-public means, such as might be possible through the use
of interpretive rules. The D.C. Circuit has already experimented with one possible
solution to a similar dilemma: require notice and comment for an interpretive rule that
looks as though it is an effort by the agency to evade public participation. See
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584-85 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Silberman, J.). That choice has the unfortunate consequence, however, of dramatically
limiting the agency's flexibility, as well as its ability to control its own staff (outside the
use of litigation) and to create predictable rules for the public. See Connolly, supra note
123, at 169-72. An alternative is simply to give rather lower deference to such rules,
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Another species of the centralization critique is that
private rights of action shift the decision to enforce against a
particular actor from the agency into the hands of the public at
large. That movement has implications for the public
accountability of enforcement decisions, an issue I discuss in
the next subpart. It also presents more practical problems,
though, for federal agencies engaged in long-term relationships
with regulated entities. When the agency shares its
enforcement power with outsiders, the agency cannot make
deals promising not to enforce the full letter of its regulations."
Yet executive control largely resolves this problem, as well. An
agency can decline to authorize private suits where they would
jeopardize a deal, or revise existing regulations to withdraw a
right of action that is proving problematic for an ongoing
compromise.
B. Accountability
Much of this Article has been, in one sense or another,
about the accountability of courts, either federal or state,
relative to other governmental entities. Courts enforcing
agency-elaborated rights of action are uniquely accountable,
however, in a way that is worth emphasizing. Some defenders
of the Supreme Court's power to declare statutes
unconstitutional have argued that the democratic legitimacy of
judicial review arises at least in part out of an ongoing
dialogue, of sorts, between the Court and the political
branches.51 When the Court's defense of rights is too vigorous,
thereby offering the agency the choice between rules that are either slow but
accountable and sure or fast but possibly insecure. See id. at 177.
A similar logic may have been at work in Judge Silberman's earlier opinion
in Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1106-08 (D.C. Cir. 1994), where the D.C. Circuit held
that it owed no deference to the EPA's interpretation of a statute under which the EPA
was bringing an enforcement action. By analogy, or in reliance on the dicta of Adams
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990) (reasoning that where Congress has
created a private right of action, it has assigned the courts, not the enforcing agency,
primary responsibility for interpreting the statute), a court might refuse to defer to
agency interpretations of private rights of action arising from its own regulations. If,
however, we found the policy consequences of that determination undesirable, we
might distinguish Adams Fruit by pointing out that rights of action "created" by
regulations in fact are premised on the notion that Congress assigned interpretive
authority directly to the executive, which in turn determined to devolve some of that
authority to courts.
250 See Seidenfeld, supra note 172, at 420.
251 See BICKEL, supra note 114, at 240; MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION,
THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 12-17, 129-30 (1984).
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the argument goes, Congress moves to restrict federal
jurisdiction. In that way, the Court's power is limited, by a kind
of deterrent, through the threat of jurisdiction stripping and
related tactics. Yet evidence that such dialogue occurs more
than epochally, or that it in fact exerts any meaningful
influence on any of the pertinent institutional actors, is
scarce."'
The dialogic effect is more evident, and has more
explanatory power for the Court's behavior, in the context of
statutory interpretation." But even there, Congress' occasional
response to judicial interpretations it believes are "wrong" does
not clearly legitimize the judicial role, assuming one believes
that judicial policy making is illegitimate in the first place.
Rather, such "corrections" merely lower the error cost of
illegitimate decisions." A more compelling case for legitimacy
could be made by showing that Congress monitored the way in
which courts interpreted and enforced its laws, expanding or
withdrawing judicial power over each statute as experience
demonstrated that courts, as institutions, were an effective
method for elaborating and carrying out each particular
scheme. That would suggest powerfully that continuing judicial
supervision was a product not only of inertia, but also of an
affirmative legislative choice of how to best develop a given set
of statutory norms."" Again, though, there is little evidence of
any such dialogue.2"
By contrast, the system proposed by this Article
virtually requires a continuing give-and-take between the
judiciary and the executive of precisely this nature. Rights of
action will generally exist only when consistent with agency
policy, or when aggressive interpretation of agency regulations
by a suspicious court forces public agency evaluation of the
place of private enforcement in its regulatory scheme. Further,
252 I should emphasize that although I am skeptical of direct inter-branch
dialogue of the classic kind envisioned by Bickel and Perry, I am inclined to agree with
Professor Friedman that courts do engage in "dialogue" with the public at large
through the courts' role as coordinators of constitutional meaning. See Barry Friedman,
Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 653-71 (1993).
2M See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST 4, 67-69 (1980); Peter L.
Strauss, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and Administered Law, ADMIN. & REG. L.
NEWS, Fall 1994, at 1, 14.
254 See CALABRESI, supra note 199, at 92-93.
2,5 Cf ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 89, at 279 (doubting that congressional
failure to amend a law represents a meaningful endorsement of judicial interpretations
of that statute).
25 See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 83-84 (1997).
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if federal agencies require exhaustion of "effective" state
remedies, those agencies will become part of a continuing,
multi-lateral exploration of the best way to carry out federal
policy. Part of the process of weighing the efficacy of state
remedies will, necessarily, be a comparison of those solutions to
the quality of results being produced by private suits. Courts
thus become "answerable" to popular will at many levels - to
federal agencies ultimately controlled by higher-ups in the
executive branch, to a Congress that is better armed with
experimental data to evaluate the wisdom of private
enforcement, and to state governments, whose innovations
challenge courts to do better.
C. Voices Crying in the Wilderness
A third major set of criticisms focuses on the power of
courts to vindicate the rights of narrow, sometimes vanishingly
small, interest groups at the expense of popular will. While the
unsettling of popular expectations might be defensible where
individual rights are central to the fairness or continued
viability of the republic and its ideals, the argument goes, mere
"policy" decisions below that level should be left principally to
politics. Thus, reluctance to discover adjudicable legal rights
prevents shifting too much that is truly policy into the hands of
courts and solitary figures not acting in the public interest.5 '
Some critics go on to claim that courts inherently lack the
political and moral authority genuinely to move social policy. "
While a court might enjoin a single cement plant from opening,
they suggest, in the end, the only way for politically weak
communities to avoid being the situs for the world's unwanted
environmental hazards is to become politically strong. By
implication, private rights of action are inadequate to vindicate
even clear legal rights stemming from large structural features
of society, which can only be affected via political processes.
In one sense, these concerns are bigger than this Article.
But crucially, the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence is
already a sort of compromise position in this debate. Obviously,
257 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 & n.4
(1938).
258 See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR
OFFICIAL WRONGS 156-61 (Yale Univ. Press 1983); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-404 (1978); Yoo, supra note 199, at
1137-39.
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that compromise has not been satisfactory to many people,
including myself. The point is that the current law does much
to blunt the criticism that might otherwise be aimed at private
rights of action to compel state regulators, perhaps in ways
that the Court has not anticipated. State sovereign immunity
from suit often politicizes the enforcement of federal law
against the states. When the effectiveness of a particular
provision depends heavily on the availability of a damages
remedy, the provision will bind states only when there is
political will at the national level to bring enforcement
actions."s In the Court's view, this limitation ties exercise of the
Supremacy Clause to popular accountability." Relatedly, the
necessity for federal intervention prevents the federal
government from enacting mandates without allocating its own
tax revenues."' The Court is thus able to nudge some of
Congress's more expansive tendencies a bit closer to the center
of popular attention without resorting to the dramatic step of
invalidating Congress's entire substantive policy as
inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment.""'
In addition to protecting a state's power over its purse,
the absence of damages remedies under § 1983 also increases
the public character of § 1983 plaintiffs. When a plaintiff can
expect a substantial damages award, all she needs in order to
secure competent counsel is, as the New York Lottery
Commission once put it, "a dollar and a dream." Despite the
availability of attorney's fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs in
§ 1983 litigation," plaintiffs suing only for prospective
injunctive relief have trouble retaining counsel." Challenges to
state administrative action are among the most complex and
time-consuming categories of litigation."' Because the success
219 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999); cf. Stewart & Sunstein,
supra note 68, at 1298-99 (arguing that forcing private plaintiffs to bear some of the
risks of unsuccessful litigation helps to reduce dangers of over-deterrence and
inefficiently high levels of enforcement through private right of action).
260 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756.
26' See Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux:
Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q.
779, 988-89 (1982).
262 See Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 160, at 1512.
262 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
264 See Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 559 & n.5 (3d Cir.
2002) (Becker, C.J., dissenting).
26 See Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J.
355, 361 (1999). Time demands fall not only on the plaintiffs counsel, but also on the
plaintiff himself Id. Thus, a lone plaintiff or a small group is at a disadvantage relative
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of an administrative challenge suit often requires extensive
expert testimony, with corresponding up-front outlays, few
plaintiffs' attorneys can afford to litigate them,
notwithstanding the possibility of winning costs upon a
favorable outcome." And few attorneys are willing to try,
considering the odds of prevailing.2 "7 The Supreme Court's
recent determination that plaintiffs who force change, but
secure no court-approved settlement, cannot recover fees under
§ 1988" has also tightened the market for counsel. Although
the Court argued in its opinion that most defendants would
have an incentive to settle, rather than simply move on their
own to moot the plaintiffs case,269 plaintiffs' attorneys thus far
seem unconvinced that lower courts will take the broad view of
mootness upon which the Supreme Court's analysis depends."'
Yet another factor in the reluctance of the plaintiffs' bar is the
potential ethical quandary for attorneys who represent clients
seeking only injunctive relief. A defendant will occasionally
offer to settle the remedial claims of a suit but refuse to pay out
any money, including for fees. The ethical rules of some states
arguably require the plaintiffs attorney to recommend
settlement in those cases.27" '
to a larger organization, which can spread out among its members the burdens of
appearing at depositions, meeting with counsel, negotiating with the opposition, and so
forth.
266 See Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 235, at 752-53. Schwab & Eisenberg
also reported that the probability of the plaintiffs success was inversely related to the
costs of the litigation. Id. The logical conclusion, though, is not that frugal lawyers did
better, but rather that plaintiffs spend more in difficult cases, so that as expenses rose,
the shortfall between what the plaintiff and its counsel actually spent, and what it
needed to spend to win, grew progressively larger.
261 See Louis S. Rulli, Employment Discrimination Litigation Under the ADA
from the Perspective of the Poor: Can the Promise of Title I Be Fulfilled for Low-Income
Workers in the Next Decade?, 9 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 345, 381 (2000) (noting
that data demonstrated that, despite fee-shifting statutes, ADA plaintiffs could not
obtain counsel unless their case was unusually likely to succeed); Schwab & Eisenberg,
supra note 235, at 774 (demonstrating that the private market failed to supply counsel
even to meritorious prisoner lawsuits in two of three federal districts studied).
'68 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health &
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
269 See id. at 609.
270 See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & MELISSA C. BROWN, ADVISING THE ELDERLY OR
DISABLED CLIENT: LEGAL, HEALTH CARE, FINANCIAL, AND ESTATE PLANNING 7.09[11]
(2d ed. 2000); DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 24.13
(3d ed. 2001); Margaret Sanner & Carl Tobias, Shifting Winds: Court Whittles Away at
Plaintiffs Recovery of Attorney Fees, 87 A.B.A. J. 39, 39 (2001); Remedies: Say Goodbye
to "Catalyst Theory" Fee Awards, FED. LITIGATOR, Jul. 2001, at 183; see also William
Funk, Supreme Court News, 26 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 12, 12 (2001).
211 See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 743 (1986) (Brennan. J., dissenting)
(arguing that Court's holding, permitting states to impose ethical obligation to settle on
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In short, plaintiffs who wish to challenge state
administrative determinations under § 1983 usually must be
able to find an attorney capable of bankrolling and otherwise
supporting a lengthy, expensive, difficult litigation with only
moderate chances for recovering any fees. For most individuals,
that means an organization committed to effecting social
change, such as the NAACP, ACLU, Chamber of Commerce, or
the pro bono committee of a state or local bar association. It
will be extremely rare for such an organization to take on
litigation, especially litigation representing such a substantial
investment of time and money, when it disagrees, at some
pertinent level of generality, with the policy goals of the suit. In
effect, a plaintiff can only find a lawyer if his or her issue
appeals to at least a fair slice of society. Granted, that is not
the same as a guarantee that only genuinely public-regarding
suits will find their way to court. Some aggrieved plaintiffs will
be rich, and need no outside assistance to secure
representation. Some well-heeled organizations are only too
happy to support causes that very few persons outside their
walls would call public regarding. The general trend, however,
will be away from lawsuits that serve only a single person or
entity toward litigation that is capable of inspiring collective
action and public service.72
Another implication of the fact that most plaintiffs will
be represented by self-described "public interest" organizations
is that the success of any remedy imposed by the court will not
civil rights attorney, would prevent many indigent plaintiffs from finding counsel);
Rulli, supra note 267, at 382 (claiming that "history has proven Justice Brennan
correct"). A related problem is suggested by Case Note, Settle or Else - Federal Rule
68 Makes Civil Rights Litigation a Risky Busines: Marek v. Chesney, 21 U.S.F. L. REV.
535 (1987) (observing that, under FED. R. CIv. P. 68, a civil rights defendant can
dramatically reduce the plaintiffs fee award by making an early offer to settle conduct
claim without fees). Since a sovereign defendant faces no risk of a damages award at
trial, it can almost always squeeze the plaintiffs fee award by offering to settle the
conduct claim on substantially the terms sought by the plaintiff, but with no fees; then,
if the plaintiff prevails at trial, since he has gained no more than was offered under the
Rule 68 settlement, his attorney gets no fees for the intervening work. The sovereign
defendant, in effect, never has any incentive to offer to settle the attorney's fees. But
see Marryshow v. Flynn, 986 F.2d 689, 690-92 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that Rule 68
offer was not more favorable than result obtained at end of litigation, because the Rule
68 offer, although otherwise comparable, did not include attorney's fees). Although in
its first iteration a beneficial outcome for plaintiffs because they can obtain almost all
their desired relief at the very beginning of the litigation in the long run, the effect is
that plaintiffs counsel won't accept such cases.
212 For a more general argument that interest groups promote democratic
and/or republican values, see ROBERT DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 23-24 (1967); THEODORE LOWE, THE END OF
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (2d ed. 1979).
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depend upon the court's political and moral influence alone. In
all likelihood, the organization representing the plaintiffs will
be "on the ground" from before the suit is filed, organizing the
community, educating lawmakers, and generally attempting to
convince the public of the rightness of their cause. 7' South
Camden Citizens in Action, for example, with the help of
Camden Regional Legal Services, generated national attention
over a single cement plant. 4 The literature of the civil rights
movement suggests that litigation and activism have
synergistic effects; dramatic court decisions can energize a
political movement.2 75 Thanks to the constraints of state
sovereign immunity, § 1983 suits against state agencies
present an unusually good likelihood of generating political
support, and, therefore, a relatively bad target for critics of the
courts.
Judicial review is often offered as a solution to the
problem of intransigent bureaucracies. In its traditional forms,
though, it has been open to accusations that it is a remedy
more bitter than the sickness cured. Yet, as the preceding
discussion reveals, § 1983 litigation does not have to fall into
the same traps that have hamstrung judicial review in other
contexts. Instead, it can be an effective tool for rendering state
bureaucracies at once more efficient and also more democratic.
A carefully-considered reading of "laws" should take account of
these important federalism effects.
273 Cf. Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 WiS.
L. REV. 277, 281-82, 284 (2002) (describing the practice of "structural lawyering," in
which the lawyer is not only a litigator but also a creative and sometimes pro-active
problem-solver).
274 See Marcia Coyle, Backyard Blues, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 15, 2001, at A10; All
Things Considered: Analysis - Disparate Impact Laws Tested in New Jersey (NPR radio
broadcast, May 7, 2001), available at 2001 WL 9434663.
275 See TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE 44-45 (1998) (noting that civil rights
leaders saw coalitions with other powerful parties with similar interests as a major
benefit of law suits, even when those suits were actually filed against the civil rights
leaders); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 354-62 (1994) (arguing that the
NAACP's failed effort to enjoin Governor Wallace from interfering with the 1965 Selma
demonstration led directly to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1965); JOEL F.
HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS & THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND
SOCIAL CHANGE 214-22 (1978); Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience:
Reflections on the Development of Sexual Harassment Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 813, 817 (2002)
(contending that litigation and social movements reinforced each other in effort to
advance the empowerment of women); see also Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 68, at
1279-80 (arguing that litigation helps to shape public values by process of reasoned
debate and public response).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The debate over enforcing regulations under § 1983 has
often been couched in the language of statutory interpretation.
Thus far, the conversation has been directed, misleadingly,
towards Congress' "intent." Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Wright frets that "determination of § 1983 'rights' has been
unleashed from any connection to congressional intent."... More
recently, several courts of appeals have relied on evanescent
distinctions between what was actually intended and what was
merely within the "reasonable contemplation" of Congress to
reject the availability of rights of action under § 1983."'7
This Article has attempted to replace ad hoc guesswork
about the minds of legislators with a more theoretically
coherent approach to statutory interpretation, ultimately
concluding that the Chevron and Bass canons require an
interpreter to conclude that the word "laws" includes agency
regulations.2'
How, then, does this conclusion relate back to the
Blessing test? A court's first step should be to look not to the
statute, but to the agency's regulations. The court may well
wish to require a fairly clear statement from the agency about
what it intends. After all, if the principal benefit of court-
agency cooperation in recognizing rights of action is that the
court can rely on the agency's accountability and policy
judgments, a court should not be too eager to discover rights
that the agency itself would reject.79 Once a court is satisfied
with what the agency intends, it can then turn back to the
statute to make certain that the regulation in question has the
"force and effect of law" - in other words, that the regulation is
276 479 U.S. 418, 438 (1987).
277 See supra notes 43-62 and accompanying text.
278 My analysis also suggests that the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), was, if not wrongly decided, then
decided on the wrong basis. One of the principal motivations for the Court's demand for
clarity in statutory rights-creating language was its presumption that § 1983 liability
undermines state autonomy. Id. at 286-87. Although intuitively appealing, we now can
see that that assumption fails to account not only for significant limitations on the
scope of § 1983 suits against states and their officers, but also for the wide, systemic
effects that § 1983 can produce. Rather than stingily guarding against the possibility of
§ 1983 litigation, the Court might well do better to remove some of its present barriers
to suit.
279 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908-09 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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validly promulgated, and that private enforcement is consistent
with the statutory scheme Congress enacted.
There are two other important components of the
analysis. First, regulations serving as the basis for a right of
action should be the product of the Administrative Procedure
Act's informal rulemaking. The agency must publish the
proposed rule in the Federal Register, or otherwise make it
available to the public; the public must get an opportunity to
make comments about the proposed rule; and the agency must
respond to each comment in issuing a final rule." This
requirement is often essential under the Chevron rationale,
because it is one of the criteria upon which Congress rests its
willingness to delegate policymaking authority."' Notice and
comment is appealing under a Bass rationale, as well, because
it increases the public visibility and republican character of the
decision to create a right of action." Additionally, to the extent
that rights of action are palatable only because control over
them rests in the highest reaches of each agency, a rulemaking
requirement helps to ensure that a court will not infer the
existence of a private right of action from less authoritative
sources, such as agency handbooks or informal directives, that
might issue from the professional staff.
The last essential element of successful administration
of agency-created rights of action is a Chevron-inspired judicial
attitude towards the nature of the judicial task. When a court
gives deference to an agency's interpretation of law under
Chevron, the court leaves open to the agency the opportunity to
change its mind and devise a new interpretation. That is,
rather than adopting the agency's interpretation as the one
correct reading of the statute, the court merely agrees that the
agency's view is a permissible one. Without this willingness on
the part of courts to limit their involvement to striking down
impermissible interpretations, agencies would lose the
flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances - a flexibility
that is one of Chevron's essential rationales.' Because agency
control over the existence and content of a right of action is
280 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
281 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 n.11 (2001); Merrill &
Hickman, supra note 82, at 883-85.
282 See id. at 885-87; cf. Geier, 529 U.S. at 909-10 & n.24 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that notice and comment helps to assure that states will have
an opportunity to engage in a dialogue with federal agencies, which might otherwise be
deaf to the states' views on whether to preempt states).
283 See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 247-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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critical under both the Chevron and Bass rationales, courts
should take the same malleable approach in deciding whether
a right of action exists under § 1983.
Finally, it is worth noting that this Article's conclusion
would not necessarily end the controversy over the availability
of private rights of action to enforce the EPA's disparate impact
regulations, or any other highly controversial set of regulations
affecting state entities. As with Chevron itself, judges will have
different notions of what is a "reasonable" interpretation of a
statute, and judges will disagree about which laws embody a
remedial scheme that comports with private enforcement. That
fact is an inevitable feature of the fact that different
interpreters have different theories of interpretation, and are
unlikely to relinquish them, regardless of our best efforts to the
contrary. Even within a single interpretive theory, many
outcomes will be value dependent. Still, the power of the
executive to enforce the law, and the right of the states to
maintain control over their own governmental processes,
demand that the burden of making those determinations be
entrusted to the courts.
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